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Abstract 
The ambiguity of our language system requires that listeners go beyond the words 
uttered, integrate contextual information, and recognize speaker cues in order to fully 
appreciate the intended meaning in messages. Counterfactual verbal irony makes this 
point salient as the intended meaning is in opposition with the literal words. While past 
work has examined how contextual factors influence irony comprehension, less is known 
about how speaker and listener characteristics impact interpretation. Addressing a gap in 
the literature, this work examined how the social status of the speaker and individual 
characteristics of listeners (i.e., shyness, history of teasing experiences, perceived social 
dominance) impacted listeners’ interpretation of literal and ironic statements. An 
undergraduate sample of participants (N = 90) completed a series of “I Spy” games and 
were told that various players (described as either high or low in social dominance) were 
watching their performance. These (virtual) players provided the participants with 
feedback on their performance, delivered as either a literal/ironic compliment or 
criticism. Following each game, participants answered questions about the speaker’s 
belief (assessing comprehension) as well as their impressions of the speaker’s attitude, 
humour, popularity, and desirability as a future social partner. Within this first-person 
task, the pattern of comprehension was consistent with the existing literature (using third-
person tasks) in that ironic statements were more difficult to comprehend than literal 
ones, especially ironic compliments. The speakers’ social dominance was not found to 
affect how participants interpreted literal or ironic statements. Listeners’ self-reported 
shyness, teasing experience, and perceived social dominance did not influence how 
speaker beliefs/attitudes were interpreted. However, these characteristics were associated 
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with perceptions of speaker popularity, such that individuals who are shy, have a history 
of teasing, or low perceived dominance, tend to view speakers who use critical language 
as being more popular. Further, those individuals with a history of teasing or high 
perceived dominance perceived ironic language as more humorous. Although tentative, 
these findings contribute to a growing literature as to how listener characteristics 
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Literature Review 
An important aspect of social development is the ability to navigate diverse 
conversational exchanges. Successful communication requires more than just 
comprehending the words uttered by a speaker. Rather, a listener must integrate 
information from a variety of sources (i.e., context, tone of voice, knowledge of speaker) 
to fully appreciate the communicative intention beyond the words themselves. Indeed, 
much of human language is ambiguous and requires that individuals attend to the mental 
states of their conversational partners in order to resolve such ambiguity (Malle & 
Hodges, 2005).  
Figurative language, which includes similes, metaphors, and hyperboles, is a 
language form that highlights communicative ambiguity given that the literal meaning of 
the words differs from a speaker’s underlying intention. When interpreting figurative 
language, it is essential that individuals attend to their conversational partners’ cues to 
identify the intention beyond the literal meaning of the words. Given the ambiguity of 
this language form, it is unsurprising that interpretations are not exactly the same for all 
individuals. Many different factors affect a recipient’s interpretation of their partner’s 
internal state within a social interaction, such as context, as well as characteristics of both 
the speaker and listener (e.g., age, language experience, culture, and cognitive 
differences; Gibbs & Colston, 2012).  
Within this literature review I will provide an overview of past work examining 
the developmental course, relevant theories, and social functions served by one type of 
figurative language, verbal irony. I will then discuss different factors that may impact 
perceptions of communicative intent within the context of verbal irony, including 
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contextual factors, such as the nature of the situation and the characteristics of the 
speaker, as well as the individual differences of the listener. 
Counterfactual Verbal Irony 
Counterfactual verbal irony, hereafter referred to as verbal irony or sarcasm, is a 
particular form of figurative language in which the speaker’s intention directly contrasts 
the literal meaning of the words (Katz & Lee, 1993). Verbal irony conveys a degree of 
social ambiguity since it includes features of both humour and aggression, and may be 
interpreted in various ways (Shapiro, Baumeister, & Kessler, 1991). Ironic speakers take 
a social risk since there is additional room for their intentions to be misinterpreted.  
Though, despite this social risk, ironic comments are made frequently in daily life. Adults 
use irony in 8% of their conversations with friends and strangers (Gibbs, 2000) and 
figurative language is used in 94% of emails—although hyperboles are used more often 
than verbal irony (Whalen, Pexman, & Gill, 2009). Children are often exposed to verbal 
irony: it is commonly found in children’s television programming (Dews & Winner, 
1997), within the classroom among their peers (Gibbs, 2000), and within conversations in 
the family environment (Recchia, Howe, Ross, & Alexander, 2010). Considering the 
prevalence of verbal irony in everyday conversation and experience, the ability to 
accurately appreciate the language form is an important aspect of communicative 
competence. 
Similar to comments spoken in a literal fashion, ironic comments can convey both 
negative intentions (i.e., ironic criticisms, saying “nice job!” after a friend misses when 
shooting a basketball) and positive intentions (i.e., ironic compliments, saying “that was 
terrible!” after finishing a delicious slice of cake).  
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There are different theories posited for how individuals process ironic language. 
For instance, some researchers argue that ironic and literal comments are processed 
similarly, in that, regardless of the statement type, the speaker’s intention constrains 
interpretation and primarily what is processed (e.g., Gibbs, 1986). Other theories such as 
the graded salience hypothesis (e.g., Giora & Fein, 1999) propose that ironic and literal 
messages activate different cognitive concepts, in which the literal meanings from ironic 
statements are processed first before recipients later adjust to an ironic interpretation. 
Regardless of how irony language is processed, there appears to be a characteristic 
developmental trajectory for comprehending ironic language. Children as young as five 
or six years old can understand a speaker’s belief and intent of ironic criticisms on 20-
50% of presented stories (Climie & Pexman, 2008; Filippova & Astington, 2008). 
However, the ability to fully appreciate ironic compliments emerges at eight to nine years 
old (Climie & Pexman, 2008), with many children at 10 to 11 years old still showing 
difficulty understanding this language form (Pexman, Glenwright, Krol, & James, 2005). 
Even within adult populations, comprehension of ironic language is not as successful as 
that for literal statements, though the comprehension of ironic criticisms is better than 
that of ironic compliments (Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2017). This difference between the 
comprehension of ironic criticisms and compliments may be due to the frequency with 
which they are encountered, with ironic criticisms used more often than ironic 
compliments (Garmendia, 2010). 
The discrepancy between the literal word meaning and the speaker’s intended 
message within ironic comments serves a number of social functions. Verbal irony is 
used to be humorous, to build and maintain close relationships, to mock or tease others, 
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to lessen the harshness of insults, and to create emotional distance (Dews, Kaplan, & 
Winner, 1995; Gibbs & Izette, 1999; Pexman, Whalen, & Green, 2010; Pexman & 
Zvaigzne, 2004). Ironic compliments can be used to convey envy of a listener’s 
accomplishments, or to highlight a recipient’s self-criticism or undeserved expectations 
of failure (Garmendia, 2010). Ironic criticisms are considered less negative than literal 
criticisms, allowing individuals to maintain their friendships by stating their true negative 
opinions in a less aggressive manner (Dews & Winner, 1995). These social goals are 
achieved because the literal meaning of ironic messages is believed to mute the intention 
of the statements (Dews & Winner, 1995). This muting effect is known as the Tinge 
Hypothesis, and functions in a similar fashion for ironic criticisms and compliments. As 
such, ironic criticisms are viewed as less harsh than literal criticisms, and ironic 
compliments are viewed as less positive than literal compliments. Both children and 
adults appreciate this muting function of verbal irony, with research showing that 
children rate ironic criticisms as less mean, and ironic compliments as less nice, than their 
literal counterparts starting at the age five to six years (Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2013).  
Adults show similar patterns: speakers of ironic criticisms were perceived as less 
annoyed than those who used literal criticisms, and speakers of ironic compliments were 
perceived as less praising than those who used literal compliments (Dews & Winner, 
1995).  
Research paradigms assessing irony interpretation often utilize third-person 
perspective tasks. Researchers create a verbal irony task that entails a conversational 
exchange between two characters in the form of vignettes or puppets (e.g., Filippova & 
Astington, 2008; Ivanko, Pexman, & Olineck, 2004; Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2013; 
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2017; Nilsen, Glenwright, & Huyder, 2011; Pexman, Glenwright, Hala, Kowbel, & 
Jungen, 2006). These short stories result in a positive or negative outcome for one 
character (e.g., kicking a soccer ball and either making the winning goal or missing the 
net), and then the other character makes a comment that is delivered in either a literal or 
ironic manner. Usually, participants are subsequently asked questions about (1) the 
speaker’s belief, whether the speaker believed the context was positive or negative; (2) 
the speaker’s intention, whether the speaker meant to be ironic or literal in their 
comment; (3) the interpretation of the ironic speaker (i.e., how mean or nice the speaker 
was, how funny the speaker was, etc.). Within this paradigm, participants are often 
exposed to four conditions: literal and ironic compliments, and literal and ironic 
criticisms. The words “compliment” and “criticism” refer to the underlying speaker 
belief, and the words “literal” and “ironic” refer to the tone of the speaker.  
One primary limitation in the field is the reliance on a particular methodology 
(i.e., third-person tasks) of which results may not hold complete ecological validity to be 
applied in real-world settings. These types of tasks may also underestimate the impact 
that individual differences play in irony interpretation. Other methodologies exploring 
verbal irony usage have involved more naturalistic settings. However, it challenging to 
create conditions in which participants produce ironic statements (e.g., Pexman, 
Zdrazilova, McConnachie, Deater-Deckard, & Petrill, 2009). This is especially true 
considering the role that close relationships play in encouraging irony usage (Pexman & 
Zvaigzne, 2004). Though infrequently used, some naturalistic research studies have 
involved video or audio recording interactions between family members and friends (e.g., 
Recchia et al., 2010).  
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Factors Affecting Verbal Irony Interpretation 
In addition to the strong support that paralinguistic cues, such as tone of voice, 
provide in irony detection/comprehension (Cheang & Pell, 2008; Glenwright, Parackel, 
Cheung, & Nilsen, 2014), a number of contextual and individual factors affect how 
individuals interpret verbal irony.  
First, the social context in which verbal irony is used influences one’s 
interpretation of ironic statements. For example, the type of relationship between two 
conversational partners impacts irony understanding. Pexman and Zvaigzne (2004) used 
written vignettes describing a conversational exchange between two individuals who 
were described to have different relationships. Results showed that people were better at 
interpreting verbal irony when the two characters were described as having a close 
relationship (versus a distant relationship), suggesting that individuals take into account 
the nature of the relationship between individuals when interpreting verbal irony, such 
that individuals within a close relationship are able to accurately infer the attitudes of 
each other.  
Research to date has also examined the characteristics of ironic speakers and how 
they affect the interpretation of verbal irony. For example, Pexman and colleagues (2006) 
presented children with stories using puppets in which the speaker puppet, who made 
either an ironic criticism or literal compliment, was described as having mean or nice 
personalities. Children were asked questions to assess their understanding of speaker 
belief, and whether they used the trait information to predict a target puppet’s behaviour. 
Results showed that children’s comprehension of verbal irony was more accurate when 
the speaker’s personality trait was congruent with the delivered statement. For instance, 
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children demonstrated better comprehension for ironic criticisms when the speaker was 
identified as a mean person, and less accuracy when the speaker was described as nice. 
This suggests that children are able to use a speaker’s personality trait information, along 
with other contextual cues (i.e., words used in the statement, tone of voice) to 
comprehend verbal irony. In addition, Katz and Pexman (1997) examined the association 
between occupation and ironic speech, and found that the recognition of irony is sensitive 
to information about a speaker’s sociocultural characteristics. Participants had better 
irony understanding for statements from speakers who had high-irony occupations (e.g., 
comedian, comic) than statements made by speakers from high-metaphor occupations 
(e.g., English professor, poet). The participants also had better memory for statements 
made by speakers from high-irony occupations.  
Reflecting a focus of the thesis (and discussed in detail in a later section), it may 
be the case that information about a speaker’s position on a “social hierarchy” will 
influence how listeners interpret verbal irony. Social hierarchy refers to the arrangement 
of individuals along a continuum in which individuals are considered to be more 
dominant or submissive than others. Social dominance is characterized as the competitive 
ability to triumph in social conflicts involving resource control and decision-making 
(Dunbar, 1988). Within the current thesis, the term “social dominance” is used 
interchangeably with “social status.” However, it is important to note these may be 
different constructs; that is, an individual who has high social status may not necessarily 
have high social dominance, and may have acquired their status through indirect means 
(e.g., being selected as socially desirable by others) (Adler & Adler, 1998; Lease, 
Musgrove, & Axelrod, 2002).  An empirical question is whether this social information 
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impacts how statements are processed. In particular, given the ambiguity inherent in 
verbal irony (and therefore potentially more breadth for interpretation), it may be that 
ironic comments are interpreted differently when spoken by individuals with different 
levels of social dominance.  
In addition to contextual factors, the individual characteristics of the person being 
asked to interpret the statements plays a role in how irony is perceived. Much work has 
focused on the contribution that socio-cognitive skills play in facilitating verbal irony 
comprehension. For instance, research shows that individuals with better perspective-
taking abilities (or Theory of Mind; ToM) are better able to understand a speaker’s 
intention during ironic exchanges (Matthews, Biney, & Abbot-Smith, 2018). For 
example, Filippova and Astington (2008) found a strong correlation between second-
order ToM and irony comprehension (r = .51); although this correlation decreased when 
controlling for receptive vocabulary, age, memory, and attunement to prosody (i.e., 
rhythm and intonation of language). Similarly, Nilsen and colleagues (2011) found that 
being able to attend to another’s mental state allows school-aged children to appreciate 
how a listener would interpret ironic language (based on what that listener did/did not 
know). Past work involving individuals with ToM deficits (i.e., people with autism, 
adults with brain damage to the prefrontal regions) offers further evidence that poor ToM 
abilities are associated with weaker irony comprehension (Happé, 1993; McDonald, 
2000). 
Linguistic ability has also been shown to play an important role in supporting 
one’s understanding of verbal irony (Filippova & Astington, 2008), along with well-
developed executive functions (Hala, Pexman, Climie, Rostad, & Glenwright, 2010). For 
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example, past work has found that working memory (Filippova & Astington, 2008) and 
inhibitory control (Caillies, Bertot, Motte, Raynaud, & Abely, 2014) are associated with 
children’s understanding of ironic statements. Additionally, studies involving adult 
patients with right hemispheric brain damage, who often experience pragmatic language 
deficits, have found a relationship between executive functioning and verbal irony 
understanding (Martin & McDonald, 2006).  
Although there is work on how socio-cognitive skills influence irony 
understanding, less work has examined how an individual’s socio-emotional 
characteristics influence irony interpretation. To speculate about possible associations 
between socio-emotional features and irony comprehension, it is useful to consider an 
individual’s social environment. Nilsen and Fecica (2011) suggested that an individual’s 
social experience is important to their ability to attend to the mental states of others 
during conversational exchanges. Individuals who engage in more communicative 
interactions are given more opportunity to learn about others’ internal mental states 
(Nelson, 2005), and thus may be better at perspective-taking tasks. As such, individuals 
who experience lower quantity or quality of social interactions may experience deficits in 
their ability to attend to others’ mental states, which may in turn impact their ability to 
accurately comprehend irony.  
One socio-emotional characteristic of interest is shyness. Shy individuals may 
experience lower quantity of social interaction given that they tend to avoid unfamiliar 
peers and speak less during social interactions (Asendorpf, 1990). The timing of shyness 
development may be important in how it affects the quantity of one’s social interactions. 
Researchers propose that fearful shyness, which involves fear and distress in response to 
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social novelty, occurs earlier in development than self-conscious shyness, which 
manifests as embarrassment and anxiety when exposed as a social object (Buss, 1986a,b). 
As such, it may be that fearful shyness leads to reduced social exposure, and thus 
individuals with fearful shyness have less experience with accessing conversational 
partner’s mental states through various communicative acts. An additional socio-
emotional characteristic of interest is one’s history of negative peer interactions; 
individuals with negative peer experiences (such as bullying) have a lower quality of 
social interactions. Through increased negative interactions, individuals may develop 
biases as to how the intentions of others are processed. These two characteristics will be 
discussed in turn; first, each trait will be described, and then there will be a review of the 
literature regarding associations between each characteristic and 
language/communication.  
Shyness 
Shyness is a temperamental style that is often characterized by being quiet, 
vigilant, and behaviorally subdued when exposed to novel stimuli. The developmental 
progression of shyness often begins in infancy, initially demonstrated as behavioural 
inhibition (Volbrecht & Goldsmith, 2010) and later on presenting as feelings of 
embarrassment, fear of rejection, and general negative biases (Asendorpf, 1990).  
Individuals who are high in shyness tend to avoid unfamiliar peers, are less likely to 
initiate social interactions, and speak less during conversations (Asendorpf, 1990; 
Asendorpf & Meier, 1993). As such, this temperamental style may be associated with 
reduced social exposure that would usually be in place to support communicative 
development.  
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Though shyness is not considered to be pathological, it is associated with 
increased risk for a number of negative outcomes such as difficulty building and 
maintaining strong positive relationships, loneliness, depression, and low self-esteem 
(Asendorpf, 1990; Booth-LaForce & Oxford, 2008). Although considered typical 
behaviour for children and adults, individuals with extreme shyness may be characterized 
as having social anxiety if it is impairing enough to their functioning. In fact, 
temperamental or trait shyness is a significant risk factor for social anxiety (Pickard, 
Rijsdijk, Happé, & Mandy, 2017) and research suggests that shyness and social anxiety 
may exist along a continuum (Brook & Willoughby, 2019; McNeil, 2001). As such, 
studies examining social anxiety are relevant to consider when discussing the 
communicative competence of shy individuals.  
Individuals with elevated shyness or social anxiety have been found to exhibit 
certain interpretative biases, leading them to see ambiguous stimuli in a more threatening 
fashion. For instance, children who are shy or socially anxious tend to interpret 
ambiguous social situations in a more hostile way than their non-anxious peers, and, in 
turn suggest more avoidant responses (Banerjee & Henderson, 2001; Chorpita, Albano, & 
Barlow, 1996). There are consistent findings within the social anxiety literature, for 
example, Constans, Penn, Ihen, and Hope (1999) found that adults with social anxiety 
interpreted vignettes depicting ambiguous social interactions as more negative than non-
anxious individuals. In addition, individuals high in social anxiety exhibited a lack of 
positive bias and the presence of a negative bias in the response selection and generation 
phases of a sentence completion task (Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews, 2007). Such 
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biases in processing social information may too be demonstrated in the communicative 
domain. 
Associations between shyness and language/communication. Much of past 
work examining associations between shyness and communication has been within the 
developmental literature; as such, relevant results from studies exploring communicative 
development in shy children will be discussed. Although there are mixed findings, 
research in the field has found that shy children have language skills that differ from their 
same-age peers. For instance, shyness is associated with learning disorders such as 
specific language deficits (Stanton-Chapman, Justice, Skibbe, & Grant, 2007), and shy 
children have lower performance on receptive and expressive language tasks than their 
non-shy peers (Evans, 1996). Coplan and Weeks (2009) found that pragmatic language 
abilities are negatively correlated with shyness levels at the start (r = -.25) and end (r - -
.19) of the school year, controlling for parental education; shy children were less 
competent in using social contextual cues to appropriately respond to common social 
scenarios. Further, pragmatic language skills were found to play a protective role for shy 
children in their socio-emotional adjustment. For children with weaker pragmatic 
language skills, shyness was associated with negative socio-emotional outcomes such as 
loneliness and social withdrawal. This association did not emerge for shy children with 
high pragmatic language abilities, suggesting that for shy children, pragmatic language 
may serve as a buffer against negative social adjustment. Cheung and Elliot (2017) 
reported similar results in their study involving shy children; those with higher pragmatic 
language skills were rated by their teachers as more well-liked by their peers. Although 
communicative difficulties are not universal in shyness / social anxiety, research suggests 
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that communicative deficits may underlie the development of social anxiety for a 
particular subgroup of individuals with the disorder (Pickard et al., 2017).  
Given the negative social biases and potential pragmatic language difficulties 
associated with shyness (Banerjee & Henderson, 2001; Coplan & Weeks, 2009), the 
interpretation of ambiguous language, such as verbal irony, may also differ with varying 
levels of shyness. Mewhort-Buist and Nilsen (2017) explored how individual differences, 
namely trait shyness, influenced adults’ interpretations of ironic statements. Participants 
were shown vignettes in which two individuals had a communicative exchange within a 
positive or negative context, and the speaker made a literal or ironic comment. The 
participants were asked about their interpretation of the scenarios and statements. Results 
showed that shy adults did not have trouble correctly interpreting a speaker’s intention 
for ironic comments. However, they rated the attitude of ironic speakers as meaner than 
did the adults lower in shyness. Similar methodologies with a child sample have yielded 
consistent results, showing that shy children (8-12 years) rate ironic speakers as meaner 
than do their non-shy peers (Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2013). Thus, across the 
developmental span, shy individuals show more negative interpretations of the intentions 
of ironic speakers, at least in the context of a third-person perspective task. 
Peer Experiences 
Negative peer experiences (also referred to as ‘peer victimization’ or ‘bullying’) 
may include intentional and harmful interpersonal acts of overt (physical: kicking, 
pushing, shoving, hitting) and covert (relational: teasing, spreading rumours) bullying. A 
target of bullying has been characterized as a frequent recipient of overt/covert aggressive 
behaviour from one or more peers over time (Ostrov & Godleski, 2007). Among adult 
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Canadians, 38% of males and 30% of females reported having experienced occasional or 
frequent bullying during their school years, and 47% of Canadian parents reported having 
a child who is a target of bullying (Canadian Bullying Statistics, 2012). Bullying is not 
only implicated in school-aged children; 40% of Canadian workers experience bullying 
on a weekly basis (Canadian Bullying Statistics, 2012).  
A host of negative socio-emotional outcomes are associated with negative peer 
interactions. During early childhood, targets of bullying experience peer rejection, 
loneliness, and a lack of prosocial behaviour (Ostrov & Godleski, 2007). In middle 
childhood, these individuals are more likely to experience difficulties related to peer 
rejection, social anxiety, social avoidance, and loneliness (Ostrov & Godleski, 2007). The 
effects of frequent bullying are detrimental even 40 years after the experiences (Wolke & 
Lereya, 2015). Targets of victimization were consistently found to be at a higher risk for 
internalizing disorders in adulthood, including diagnoses of anxiety disorder and 
depression (Wolke & Lereya, 2015).  
Similar to shyness, past work examining past peer experiences has primarily been 
found within developmental research; as such, relevant results from child studies 
exploring the influence of peer interactions on communicative development will be 
discussed. Negative peer experiences are associated with impairment in a number of 
socio-cognitive abilities. Individuals who have difficulty detecting the intentions of other 
people may be more susceptible to manipulation by others (Sutton, Smith, & 
Swettenham, 1999). In addition, individuals who have been bullied tend to have impaired 
empathy (Malti, Perren, & Buchmann, 2010) and negative peer experiences lead 
individuals to be less attuned to and less interested in others’ emotions over time.   
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Moreover, studies show that being teased contributes to the development of 
negative schemas and dysfunctional cognitions; individuals who have been victimized 
score high on interpretations of hostility, anger, and retaliation (Camodeca & Goossens, 
2005; McCabe, Miller, Laugesen, Antony, & Young, 2010). As such, it may be the case 
that individuals who have a history of negative peer experiences enter social interactions 
with pre-existing negative biases that affects how they interpret and respond to others’ 
communicative language (i.e., Social Information Processing Theory, Crick & Dodge, 
1994). Interpreting a situation or conversational partner to have hostile or threatening 
intentions is likely to lead to aggressive responses (i.e., Hostile Attribution Bias, Crick & 
Dodge, 1996). Although much of the research on Social Information Processing Theory 
and the Hostile Attribution involves child samples, studies have shown similar results 
with adults (e.g., Epps & Kendall, 1995).  
Associations between negative peer experiences and language / 
communication. While victimization contributes to the formation of social biases, these 
experiences are also associated with language impairment. Namely, language deficits 
negatively influence children’s ability to interact with their peers (Brinton & Fujiki, 
1999; Hadley & Schuele, 1998), and thus may put them at risk as targets of bullying and 
social rejection. This being said, Lindsay, Dockrell, and Mackie (2008) explored the 
susceptibility to social problems in children with language difficulties, and found no 
significant correlation between victimization and language ability. However, the 
researchers speculated that children with specific language impairments might have 
under-reported the frequency of negative peer interactions because they lacked awareness 
of the salience of these interactions.  
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Together, work in this area suggests that language impairments may lead to 
negative peer experiences, although the relationship is likely to be bidirectional. 
Consequently, those who have been victims of bullying may also subsequently develop 
language impairments. However, this has yet to be explored in research and much of the 
literature has found associations between language deficits and victimization. For 
example, Black and Logan (1995) examined how peer experiences shaped children’s 
communicative styles by studying dyadic conversations. Results showed that children 
socially rejected by peers made less competent social contributions in social interactions 
such as non-contingent responses and less explanations in conversations. During play, 
targets of victimization were also more likely to make demands and less likely to offer 
suggestions. In addition, Mewhort-Buist, Nilsen, and Bowman-Smith (2019) examined 
how children’s peer experiences impact communicative choices. They found that those 
with a history of negative peer experiences were more likely to endorse unskilled 
responses such as telling the truth following someone’s negative performance. These 
results show that these individuals may be less sensitive to the social norms surrounding 
social blunders, such as avoiding drawing attention to someone’s mistake. Together this 
work points to associations between negative peer experience and communicative 
competence.  
However, little is known about how peer experiences shape how individuals 
interpret ambiguous language, such as verbal irony. Verbal irony serves several social 
functions that may be prevalent in victimization, such as to mock or tease others (Pexman 
et al., 2010) and social bullying (Sheehan & Jordan, 2002). Although it has yet to be 
studied, it may be that targets of victimization, with associated weaker socio-cognitive 
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skills, have more difficulty comprehending irony. Moreover, it may be the case that the 
negative social biases associated with adverse peer experiences result in more negative 
interpretations of ironic speakers.  
Interim Summary 
In sum, while much work has charted the developmental course of irony 
understanding and a number of contextual influences, much less work has examined 
associations between individual characteristics of a listener and irony interpretation.  Of 
particular interest are shyness and negative peer interactions due to their impact on one’s 
social environment (i.e., lowered quantity and quality of social interactions, respectively) 
and interpretation of communicative intentions. However, how an individual interprets 
verbal irony may be a result of both their own characteristics as well as the characteristics 
of the speaker, or an interaction between both. Of particular interest is whether the 
influence of individual differences in shyness and peer experiences differs when 
statements are delivered by speakers who are high versus low in social dominance. 
Below, research on social hierarchy will be presented, followed by previous work 
examining associations between shyness/peer experiences and social hierarchy.  
Social Hierarchy 
As mentioned briefly above, social hierarchy arranges individuals along a social 
ladder, such that an individual at a higher position (i.e., high social dominance) holds the 
competitive ability to triumph in resource control and decision-making (Dunbar, 1988). 
Individuals lower in social rank have limited access to social resources (e.g., a promotion 
at work, or a romantic partner), suggesting that one’s social status provides exposure to 
different types of social experiences. It may be that these social encounters vary because 
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of how others engage in the interactions; that is, individuals may behave differently 
towards their social partner depending on their position on the social hierarchy.  
Research shows that individuals may unintentionally exhibit a more positive bias 
towards individuals who are high in social dominance (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002). 
Individuals with higher social rank are considered socially central, and thus receive more 
attention from their peers and are evaluated more favorably as potential social partners 
(Jost et al., 2002; La Freniere & Charlesworth, 1983). Individuals also perceive people 
with high social dominance as more competent than those with low social dominance 
despite their actual competence, due to their confidence and initiative-taking behaviours 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). A positive bias towards individuals of high social 
dominance likely stems from their ability to control resources to achieve a desired goal in 
a peer group—even if doing so requires aggressive behaviour (Charafeddine, et al., 
2016). In fact, it is viewed as more acceptable for those of high social rank to engage in 
aggressive behaviour than those of low social status (Adams, Bartlett, & Bukowski, 
2010). Thus, conflict with people of high social rank may be considered more harmful 
than those with people of low social rank, since offending an individual of high social 
dominance may lead to limited access to resources, ostracism, or even physical harm 
(Gilbert, 2001). The consequences that follow conflict with individuals low in social 
dominance do not hold the same stakes given their lack of social power. Individuals may 
be more wary of how they interact with those higher in social status and take precautions 
to avoid social conflicts with them. As such, interpersonal interactions differ depending 
on a social partner’s position on the social hierarchy. 
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It may be that communicative utterances from individuals high in social 
dominance are viewed differently than those from individuals low in social dominance, 
particularly for ambiguous language. For instance, riskiness of conflict with an individual 
with high social rank may lead one to overestimate how negative their statements are, in 
order to ensure social safety and avoidance of harmful outcomes. Alternatively, socially 
risky language forms such as irony may be perceived as more socially appropriate when 
delivered by an individual who is high in social rank (versus low in social rank). In 
addition, how statements from speakers with high/low social dominance are interpreted 
may depend on a recipient’s own personal characteristics. Two characteristics of interest 
(shyness and negative peer experiences) are examined below, in relation to their 
interaction with social dominance. 
Shyness and social hierarchy. Given the lack of research looking at the 
association between shyness and social hierarchy, studies from the social anxiety 
literature is relevant in this section.  
A notable characteristic of individuals with social anxiety is their high sensitivity 
to social hierarchy information when related to themselves and others. Gilbert’s (2001) 
evolutionary model of social hierarchy and social anxiety proposes that individuals with 
social anxiety perceive themselves as low in social rank. Individuals high in social 
anxiety also engage in more submissive, and less dominant behaviours than those low in 
anxiety, likely to avoid conflict with those high in social dominance (Gilboa-Schechtman 
et al., 2017; Heerey & Kring, 2007; Rodebaugh, Bielak, Vidovic, & Moscovitch, 2016; 
Walters & Hope, 1998). Additionally, people with social anxiety are sensitive to 
information about others’ social rank, in that they rate characters high in dominance as 
	20	
more dominant than do non-anxious individuals (Aderka, Haker, Marom, Hermesh, & 
Gilboa-Schechtman, 2013; Haker, Aderka, Marom, Hermesh, & Gilboa-Schechtman, 
2014). Individuals with social anxiety also request less information about characters 
before assigning social ranks, and make more revisions in their ratings after being given 
additional information (Aderka et al., 2013; Haker et al., 2014). Thus, when assigning 
social rank to others, individuals with social anxiety tend to over-rank people with high 
social dominance, and are highly sensitive to cues of social status. The salience of social 
rank information allows individuals with social anxiety to detect their social partner’s 
dominance, even if it is an overestimation.  
Thus, within the context of interpreting statements from others, it may be that shy 
individuals interpret communicative intentions of ironic speakers as more negative than 
non-shy individuals (consistent with Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2017), and further, these 
social biases may interact with the social dominance of the speaker. That is, negative 
social biases towards ironic speakers may be exacerbated when the speakers are 
described as high (versus low) in social dominance, or, it may be that speakers described 
as high in social dominance are perceived more positively than those low in social 
dominance.  
Negative peer experiences and social hierarchy. There is a paucity of research 
exploring how a history of negative peer experiences influences the interpretation of 
social dominance information. However, social status is an important contextual cue 
within peer interactions such that exposure to victimization differs according to one’s 
position on the social hierarchy. Targets of victimization are often individuals lower in 
the social hierarchy, since they are considered easy targets for aggression (Prinstein & 
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Cillessen, 2003). Those who are low in social rank may be perceived as easier targets and 
are picked on by individuals with high social dominance as a signal of their high social 
power (de Bruyn, Cillessen, & Wissink, 2010).  
Social hierarchy information pertaining to oneself appears to be salient to those 
who have had negative peer experiences. For example, children with negative peer 
interactions are sensitive to information confirming their own low social status (i.e., how 
disliked they are; Cillessen & Bellmore, 1999). However, little is known about how one’s 
negative peer experiences influences the interpretation of others’ social dominance. The 
literature shows that individuals with a history of victimization are often targeted by 
others higher in social dominance (de Bruyn et al., 2010), and thus may develop negative 
social biases towards these individuals (though see work by Prinstein & Cillessen (2003) 
for evidence that individuals with lower levels of social dominance also demonstrate 
bullying behaviour).  Past work suggests that victimization plays a role in perceiving 
popular individuals as more threatening, although this pattern emerged only for young 
females (Hunter, Boyle, & Warden, 2007). Alternatively, it may be that individuals with 
victimization experience perceive those high in social dominance in a more positive light. 
Consequently, individuals who have experienced peer victimization may interpret the 
communicative intentions of speakers differently depending on whether the speakers are 
high versus low in social status.   
Summary and Future Directions 
Taken together, work in the verbal irony literature has explored a number of 
contextual factors that influence irony interpretation. The characteristics of the ironic 
speaker have been found to be an important cue when interpreting ironic comments (e.g., 
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Katz & Pexman, 1997; Pexman et al., 2006). However, the social dominance of the 
speaker has not been studied in relation to perceptions of verbal irony. Given the 
differential social power held by individuals high in social dominance, it may be that 
their social partners interpret their statements differently than if the statement was 
delivered by an individual low in social dominance. For instance, given that high social 
rank is associated with an overall positive bias, and socially aggressive behaviour is seen 
as more acceptable when from an individual high in social rank, statements from 
individuals high in social dominance may be interpreted as more positive (e.g., more 
nice, more funny, etc.). Alternatively, due to the greater social influence of high ranked 
individuals, statements may carry more weight and thus statements from those high in 
dominance may be interpreted as more negative (e.g., more mean, less funny, etc.). 
Regardless of the direction of the influence, such biases may be more pronounced when 
interpreting ambiguous language, such as irony (versus literal statements), given that 
there is more room for interpretation. Moreover, it may be that the salience of the social 
dominance of the speaker is dependent on the characteristics of the listener.   
While much work has investigated the cognitive skills associated with verbal 
irony interpretation, individual differences in social characteristics have received less 
attention. It may be the case that individuals who have elevated levels of shyness or 
increased negative peer experiences interpret the intentions of speakers, particularly 
ironic speakers, differently, due to the associated social biases. Additionally, social rank 
is a salient social cue for individuals who are shy and have negative peer experiences, 
and, as such, these individuals may exhibit high sensitivity or biases when interpreting 
statements from speakers with high versus low social dominance. It is hypothesized that 
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individuals who are shy or who have had teasing experience will generally interpret 
ironic language in a more negative fashion, and this will be further exacerbated when 




Successful communication requires more than just comprehending the words 
uttered by a speaker; rather, a listener must integrate information from a variety of 
sources (e.g., context, tone of voice, knowledge of speaker) to fully appreciate the 
communicative intention beyond the words’ literal meaning. Indeed, much of human 
language is ambiguous and requires that individuals attend to the mental states of their 
conversational partners in order to resolve such ambiguity.  
Counterfactual verbal irony, henceforth referred to as verbal irony or sarcasm, is a 
form of figurative language which highlights communicative ambiguity given that the 
speaker’s intention directly contrasts the literal meaning of the words (Katz & Lee, 
1993). When interpreting verbal irony, it is essential that individuals attend to their 
conversational partner’s cues as well as the situation to identify the intention beyond the 
literal meaning of the words. Despite its risk for misunderstanding due to the increased 
ambiguity, this language form is used frequently in conversations within family, friends, 
strangers (Gibbs, 2000; Recchia et al., 2010), and within emails (Whalen et al, 2009).  
Verbal irony can be used to serve a number of social functions. The discrepancy 
between speaker intention and the literal words enables ironic comments to convey either 
negative intentions (i.e., criticisms, saying “nice job!” after a friend misses when shooting 
a basketball) or positive intentions (i.e., compliments, saying “that was terrible!” after 
finishing a delicious slice of cake). In this way, verbal irony can be used to 
simultaneously convey both humour and aggression (Shapiro et al., 1991). It can also be 
used to lessen the harshness of insults and create emotional distance (Dews et al., 1995). 
These social goals are achieved because the literal meaning of ironic messages is thought 
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to mute the intention of the statements (Dews & Winner, 1995), making ironic criticisms 
less “critical,” and ironic compliments less “complimentary,” than their literal 
compliments. Past work has found that by the age of five or six years old, children are 
able to appreciate ironic criticisms, and by eight or nine they understand ironic 
compliments (Climie & Pexman, 2008, Filippova & Astington, 2008). For adults, 
comprehension of literal comments is typically better than ironic comments, and ironic 
criticisms are easier to understand than ironic compliments (Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 
2017).  
There are different theories as to how ironic language is interpreted. Gibbs (1986) 
argues that ironic and literal statements are processed the same way, in which only the 
speaker’s intention is processed regardless of the statement type. Other theories such as 
the graded salience hypothesis (e.g., Giora & Fein, 1999) propose that ironic and literal 
messages are interpreted differently, in which the literal meanings of ironic statements 
are processed before the ironic understanding.   
As may be expected given the ambiguity of verbal irony, a number of different 
factors affect the interpretation of this language form. That is, individuals can form 
various perceptions of ironic language based on a number of internal or external factors 
(e.g., age, culture, context, etc.; Gibbs & Colston, 2012). However, while there is a rich 
history of verbal irony research in general, there is a relative paucity of work examining 
how contextual and individual factors influence irony interpretation. The present work 
seeks to address this gap through an examination of how the characteristics of the 
speakers may impact how irony is interpreted, as well as how the individual 
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characteristics of the listeners (i.e., participants) impact interpretations. These factors will 
be considered in turn. 
With respect to speaker characteristics, it has been found that individuals expect 
verbal irony to take place in certain social contexts (i.e., who is interacting). For example, 
Pexman and Zvaigzne (2004) found that relationship cues were important when 
interpreting verbal irony. That is, people were better at interpreting verbal irony when the 
social partners were described as having a close relationship (versus a distant 
relationship). Further, speaker characteristics, such as personality traits (Pexman et al., 
2006) and occupation (Katz & Pexman, 1997) affect how irony is interpreted. Past work 
revealed that verbal irony comprehension was more accurate when the ironic speakers 
were described as mean (Pexman et al., 2006), and as having high-irony occupations 
(e.g., comedian, comic) (Katz & Pexman, 1997). Of interest in the present work is the 
degree to which the social status of the speaker may impact the interpretation of verbal 
irony.  
An individual’s social status may be viewed along a hierarchy or social ladder, 
such that an individual of high social status holds the competitive ability to triumph in 
resource control and decision-making (Dunbar, 1988). According to the Social 
Dominance theory, individuals with high and low social rank possess differential 
amounts of social power (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001), which exposes them to different 
types of social experiences and interactions. Moreover, others’ perceptions may be 
influenced by social status. More specifically, individuals unintentionally exhibit a more 
positive bias towards individuals who are high in social dominance/rank (Jost et al., 
2002). For example, Anderson and Kilduff (2009) found that individuals with high social 
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dominance are perceived as more competent by their group members, despite their actual 
competence. Individuals with high social rank are considered socially central, and thus 
receive more attention from their peers and are evaluated more favorably as potential 
social partners (Jost et al., 2002; La Freniere & Charlesworth, 1983). This positive bias 
towards individuals high in social dominance likely stems from their ability to control 
resources to achieve a desired goal; however, resource control may require individuals to 
engage in aggressive behaviour (Charafeddine, et al., 2016). In fact, it is more acceptable 
for those of high social status to engage in aggressive behaviour than those of low social 
status (Adams et al., 2010).  
Thus, it may be the case that listeners infer the communicative intentions of 
individuals with high versus low social status differently, and particularly when speakers 
deliver ambiguous language that can have various interpretations. That is, it may be that 
verbal irony, which can involve an aggressive undertone (Shapiro et al., 1991), may be 
viewed as more acceptable or positive when delivered by a speaker high in social 
dominance. Alternatively, verbal irony delivered by a speaker with high social rank may 
highlight the aggressiveness of the language form, given that conflict with those high in 
the social hierarchy may lead to adverse social consequences such as ostracism and less 
access to resources (Gilbert, 2001). This notion reflects the first aim of the research 
study, namely investigating how literal and ironic statements directed at a listener are 
interpreted, and whether such interpretations differ based on the social dominance of the 
speaker. 
Returning to the discussion regarding factors influencing irony interpretation, the 
characteristics of the listeners also play a role. For example, studies have shown that 
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listeners who have more advanced socio-cognitive skills are better able to detect and 
comprehend verbal irony. Skills that have been identified as supporting verbal irony 
comprehension include perspective-taking ability (Filippova & Astington, 2008; Nilsen et 
al., 2011), linguistic ability (Filippova & Astington, 2008), and executive functions, such 
as working memory and inhibitory control (Caillies et al., 2014; Filippova & Astington, 
2008; Hala et al., 2010).  
 In addition to cognitive skills, variations in socio-emotional functioning impact 
irony comprehension. Studies show that children with Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD) have poorer understanding of ambiguous social situations and subtle 
forms of sarcasm (Ludlow, Chadwick, Morey, Edwards, & Gutierrez, 2017). According 
to theories of communicative perspective-taking, an individual’s social environment is an 
important factor in how individuals infer the communicative intentions of others (Nilsen 
& Fecica, 2011). Individuals with more social exposure would have more opportunity to 
learn about others’ mental states (Nelson, 2005). As such, variation in the quantity or 
quality of social interactions may be associated with differential interpretations of a 
speaker’s intentions, particularly within ambiguous language. Building on this notion, the 
second aim of this study is to study whether characteristics related to social experiences, 
specifically shyness and negative peer interactions, influence how communicative 
intentions behind literal and ironic language are interpreted.  
Shyness is a temperamental style that is associated with less exposure to social 
interactions; research has found that, although individuals who are shy tend to behave 
comparably to their non-shy peers when around familiar people (Asendorpf & Meier, 
1993), these individuals tend to avoid unfamiliar peers, are less likely to initiate social 
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interactions, and speak less during conversations in unfamiliar situations (Asendorpf, 
1990; Asendorpf & Meier, 1993). Although shyness is not considered to be pathological, 
temperamental or trait shyness is a significant risk factor for social anxiety (Pickard et al., 
2017) and research suggests that shyness and social anxiety may exist along a continuum 
(Brook & Willoughby, 2019; McNeil, 2001).  
Shyness has been associated with biases in processing social information. For 
example, shy children interpret ambiguous social situations in a more hostile or 
threatening fashion (Banerjee & Henderson, 2001). Similarly, adults with social anxiety 
view mildly negative social interactions as more overtly negative (Stopa & Clark, 2000). 
Research investigating the ability to reason about another’s mind found that individuals 
with elevated social anxiety tend to make over-mentalizing errors when interpreting the 
mental states of others (Hezel & McNally, 2014; Washburn, Wilson, Roes, Rnic, & 
Harkness, 2016). That is, they attributed more intense emotions and greater meaning to 
others’ emotions and thoughts than individuals without social anxiety. Thus, the 
communicative intentions of others may too be interpreted in a more negative way, 
particularly for ambiguous language since there is more room for different 
interpretations. Indeed, past work has found that adults with elevated traits of shyness 
were showed to be comparable to their non-shy peers when comprehending irony, but 
reported that ironic speakers were meaner, particularly when making ironic compliments 
(Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2017). Similar findings were demonstrated in a school-age 
population, albeit for ironic criticisms (Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2013). That is, children 
with elevated shyness were able to comprehend the beliefs of a speaker successfully, but 
saw the intentions behind the ironic language as meaner. These researchers reason that 
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when faced with both positive and negative information (as with ironic language), 
individuals with elevated shyness may attend more to the negative information, thereby 
attributing more hostile intentions. However, past work in this area has involved third 
person perspective tasks where the individual is not embedded within the interaction, but 
is merely an observer (e.g., Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2013; 2017). It remains to be 
determined how an individual’s level of shyness is associated with interpretations of 
ironic statements that are directed at them. 
While shyness influences one’s quantity of social exposure, in that individuals 
tend to withdraw from social interactions, particularly novel ones, the quality of 
interactions individuals experience may also shape how communicative intentions are 
interpreted. Negative peer experiences (henceforth also referred to as “peer 
victimization”) include acts of overt and covert bullying.  
Repeated exposure to victimization leads to various socio-cognitive deficits 
(Malti et al., 2010; Sutton et al., 1999) and negative social biases. More specifically, 
individuals who have been victimized score high on interpretations of hostility, anger, 
and retaliation (Camodeca & Goossens, 2005; McCabe, Miller et al., 2010).  As such, 
these individuals may view social partners to have hostile or threatening intentions and 
subsequently engage in aggressive responses (i.e., Hostile Attribution Bias; Crick & 
Dodge, 1996). Moreover, associations between victimization and communicative 
competence have been found (Lindsay et al., 2008). For instance, children who are 
targets of bullying make less competent social contributions in dyadic conversations 
(Black & Logan, 1995). In addition, children with a history of negative peer experiences 
were more likely to endorse less skilled communicative responses, such as telling the 
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truth following someone’s negative performance (Mewhort-Buist et al., 2019). Thus, a 
history of negative experiences with peers may impact how the communicative intentions 
of others are interpreted. Moreover, as verbal irony can be used to mock or tease 
(Pexman et al., 2010) and is involved in social bullying (Sheehan & Jordan, 2002), it may 
be that individuals with a history of peer victimization have increased experience with 
ironic language and thus interpret it differently. 
In sum, there is reason to believe that a listener’s degree of shyness and/or history 
of negative experiences with peers may impact how the communicative behaviour of 
others is interpreted. However, it may too be the case that there are important interactions 
between listener and speaker characteristics. As such, the impact that a listener 
characteristic plays on the interpretation of communicative intent may depend on the 
characteristics of the speaker. The present study explores how shyness and negative peer 
experiences may affect how utterances from high versus low socially dominant speakers 
are interpreted.  
Supporting this idea, research suggests that individuals who are shy or socially 
anxious interpret social hierarchy information differently than non-shy individuals. That 
is, they request less information about others before assigning social ranks, and make 
more revisions in their ratings after being given additional information (Aderka et al., 
2013; Haker et al., 2014). This high sensitivity to social rank information leads 
individuals with social anxiety to overestimate their social partner’s dominance, and view 
those high in social dominance as more dominant than do their non-anxious peers 
(Aderka et al., 2013; Haker et al., 2014). Individuals with social anxiety (who perceive 
themselves to be low in social rank; Gilbert, 2001) respond differently to others who are 
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socially dominant, such as engaging in more submissive and less dominant behaviours, 
and are more likely to avoid conflict with individuals with high social dominance 
(Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2017; Rodebaugh et al., 2016). Thus, shy individuals may be 
more sensitive to the social dominance of a speaker and interpret statements from 
speakers who have high versus low social status more differently (versus non-shy 
individuals).  
Although there is little work exploring how individuals with victimization history 
interpret social dominance information, research shows that social rank is indeed an 
important contextual cue within negative peer experiences. The literature shows that 
targets of victimization are often lower in the social hierarchy (de Bruyn et al., 2010; 
Prinstein & Cillessen, 2003), and are more sensitive to information about their own low 
social rank (Cillessen & Bellmore, 1999). They are often bullied by others higher in 
social dominance, and thus may perceive individuals of high social status as more 
threatening than do those with less victimization experience (Hunter et al., 2007). 
Therefore, it may be that individuals with adverse peer experiences are more sensitive to 
social hierarchy information. Thus, in the context of interpreting statements from others, 
the social dominance of the speaker may too play an important role.  
Present Study 
The present work examined individual’s interpretation of ironic and literal 
comments during a first-person task wherein the individuals were situated within the 
communicative exchange. Participants engaged in a series of games on a tablet and were 
told that various other players were watching their performance (i.e., on another tablet). 
These (virtual) players provided the participants with verbal feedback on their 
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performance on the task, delivered as either a literal/ironic compliment (i.e., commenting 
on a fast time) or criticism (commenting on a slow time). Participants then answered 
questions regarding the speaker’s belief as well as their impressions of the speaker (e.g., 
how mean/nice he/she was, would they spend time with him/her in the future, how 
popular did you think he/she was, how funny he/she was). 
The first research aim was to investigate the interpretation of literal and ironic 
statements within a first-person task, and whether the social status of the speaker 
impacted how statements were interpreted. This goal was achieved by situating the 
participants within the conversational exchange, and providing the participants with 
information about the social status of the speaker prior to them hearing statements from 
this (virtual) individual. It was hypothesized that the first-person task will elicit similar 
comprehension patterns as third-person tasks that are predominantly used in the verbal 
irony literature. Further, it was hypothesized that statements from players high in social 
dominance will be interpreted differently than statements from those low in social 
dominance. However, the direction of such an effect is unknown. That is, as per past 
work showing a positive bias towards socially dominant individuals, as well as the fact 
that social aggression is more acceptable when enacted by individuals who are of high 
dominance, their statements generally could be viewed as more positive (e.g., more nice, 
more funny, etc.). In contrast, receiving comments from individuals who are of high 
social status may be more impactful, thereby rendering their statements as being 
perceived as more negative (more mean, less funny). The second aim was to investigate 
whether participants’ shyness and/or history of negative peer experiences influenced their 
interpretation of statements generally, as well as interacting with the influence of the 
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social status of the speaker. Thus, in addition to the first-person task, participants also 
completed questionnaires measuring shyness, social anxiety, and history of teasing.  
Participants’ shyness and negative peer interactions were predicted to be associated with 
more negative interpretations of ironic speakers (e.g., more mean, less funny), 
particularly when the speakers were described as having high social rank.  
The final aim was to investigate whether participants’ perceptions of their own 
social dominance influenced their interpretation of speaker utterances and whether this 
lead to differential interpretations when receiving statements from high versus low social 
status speakers. Thus, participants were asked to provide ratings of their own social 
dominance prior to engaging in the interactive task. Little work has been done exploring 
how high/low perceived social dominance influences one’s interpretation of others’ social 
rank. However, previous literature suggests there is more social conflict between 
interactions of high and low social status individuals, often with more detrimental 
consequences for those of low social status (Gilbert, 2001; Prinstein & Cisllessen, 2003). 
As such, participants with low perceived dominance may be more sensitive to the social 
status of others due to increased riskiness of the interactions. Given the aggressive 
undertones of verbal irony, it may be that individuals with low perceived dominance 
interpret ironic comments as more negative than those with high perceived dominance, 




Participants (N = 90; 32 males, M = 20.28 years; SD = 1.87) were recruited from 
the University of Waterloo’s online SONA system. The majority of participants (58.75%) 
reported English as their first language (data was missing from 10 participants). The most 
frequently reported ethnicity was North American (n = 38), and the second most 
frequently reported ethnicity was Asian (n = 23) (missing data n = 15).  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a research laboratory during one session 
that lasted approximately 60 minutes. The sequence of task administration was consistent 
across participants: the verbal irony task, a vocabulary measure, and questionnaires 
(shyness, social anxiety, and teasing experience).1 The verbal irony task was completed 
on a tablet, the vocabulary measure was administered by the researcher, and the 
remaining questionnaires were answered in a printed booklet.  
To evaluate how participants interpreted statements by others, they participated 
in a task (referred to in this thesis as the verbal irony task) where they completed a 
series of ‘games’ (i.e., “I Spy” games) and were then provided with comments from 
other players who presumably observed their gameplay. The comments from the other 
players differed by statement type (ironic or literal) as well as by valence (criticism or 
compliment). Moreover, the characteristics of the other (fictional) players were 
manipulated to be either high or low social dominance, thus, resulting in a 2(statement 
type) x 2(valence) x 2(social dominance) design. The order of conditions was fully 
																																																								
1 Participants were also asked to report on depressive symptoms, but this measure is not discussed further in the thesis.  
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counterbalanced across participants. There were 16 trials in the task (i.e., two in each 
condition). 
 Personal dominance rating. Before participants began the task, an examiner 
helped them create a game profile in which they answered various questions related to 
their own social dominance (see Figure 1a). The questions were presented in a 10-point 
Likert scale format. The first question, “How comfortable are you around others?” 
ranged from 1 (Never comfortable) to 10 (Always comfortable). The next question, 
“How confident are you speaking in group settings?” ranged from 1 (Not at all 
confident) to 10 (Very confident). And the third question, “How comfortable are you in 
leadership roles?” had response options that ranged from 1 (Not comfortable) to 10 
(Pretty comfortable). This process provided information about participants’ view of 
their own social dominance and served the purpose of increasing the believability of the 
task (i.e., as they are subsequently shown profiles they are told were created by other 
participants, see Figure 1b for an example). These questions were based on a review of 
the social dominance literature and measures of dominance/submissiveness [e.g., 
Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP-48; Gude, Moum, Kaldestad, & Friis, 2000); 
International Personality Item Pool—Interpersonal Circumplex (IPIP-IPC; Markey & 
Markey, 2009); King, Johnson, & Van Vugt, 2009)]. Responses to the personal 
dominance questions were analyzed for reliability, and yielded a Cronbach’s alpha 
value of .795. 
 Each game trial began when participants were shown a virtual player’s profile 
(gender matched to the participant) and were told that this specific player would be able 
to see their gameplay on that trial (see Figure 1b for an example). The profiles of the 
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virtual players consisted of answers to the questions the participants had answered 
about themselves. The profiles were created to present the virtual players as being 
either high or low social rank—that is, an individual who was high in social dominance 
had a profile that indicated he/she was more comfortable around others, highly 
confident speaking in group settings, and comfortable in leadership roles (and reverse 
for individuals who were low in social dominance).  
After finding out who would be observing their game play, participants were 
informed which items they had to find within the “I Spy” game (see Figure 1c). Each 
trial was timed, and participants were given feedback on their performance compared to 
the average time of others who completed each trial (see Figure 1d). However, in 
reality, the “average time” that participants saw was a ratio of their own time, and not 
the actual average completion time of others. That is, in order to create contexts where 
the participants did well (and were complimented by the other player) or did poorly 
(and thus were criticised by the other player), they were told that they completed the 
task either faster (i.e., positive context) or slower (i.e., negative context) than the 
average time.  
After participants found out about their performance (relative to other players), 
the virtual player sent them a message. The messages from the virtual players were 
presented as pre-recorded audio recordings to ensure standardized procedures. The 
comments were of either positive valence (i.e., a compliment; commenting on a quicker 
completion time than average), or negative valence (i.e., a criticism; commenting on a 
slower completion time than average). Moreover, each message was recorded in either 
a literal or ironic tone. Literal comments were spoken with an authentic, blunt tone of 
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voice—literal compliments were spoken with a sincere, friendly tone (e.g., “That was a 
pretty fast time!”), while the literal criticisms were delivered in a blunt, neutral tone 
(e.g., “That was a pretty slow time!”). Ironic comments were spoken with a mocking or 
teasing tone of voice, with some words dragged out for emphasis, in which ironic 
compliments were spoken in a teasing manner (e.g., “That was a pretty slow time!”), 
and ironic criticisms were delivered in a mocking tone (e.g., “That was a pretty fast 
time!). Recordings were created using eight males and females who provided the 
statements for each specific “I Spy” game trial in the four different conditions (i.e., 
literal/ironic criticisms, literal/ironic compliments) so that the specific voice actors 
would be counterbalanced across conditions.  
To increase the authenticity of the “I Spy” game, each participant was given 
eight opportunities to view the gameplay of other virtual players, see how they 
(presumably) did relative to the average player, and send them an audio message, as 
well. Participants were given a choice between a message with a positive valence (e.g., 
that was a pretty fast time) or negative valence (e.g., that was a pretty slow time). They 
were also told that they could say the message in a tone of their own choice.   
Following each message sent from the virtual players, participants were asked a 
series of five questions.2 
Speaker belief. The first question, the “speaker belief question,” assessed 
participants’ understanding of the speakers’ true beliefs with respect to their 
performance on the task (i.e., if he/she was fast or slow compared to the average; e.g., 
“Did Sally think you were fast or slow on this trial?”). A response was considered 
																																																								
2 Participants also answered another question about the speaker’s view, but to minimize the number of outcome 
variables is not discussed in the thesis. 
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accurate if, for criticisms, participants rated that the speaker thought their time was 
slow; for compliments, participants were correct if they rated that the speaker thought 
their time was fast. The proportion of times that each participant correctly identified the 
speaker’s belief for each statement type was used for subsequent analyses. Consistent 
with previous studies (e.g., Glenwright & Pexman, 2010; Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 
2019), this question was also used as a control question; that is, responses to subsequent 
questions were only included in analysis when the participants could accurately 
appreciate the speaker’s beliefs.  
Meanness rating. The second question assessed the understanding of the social 
intentions of the speaker (i.e., “How mean or nice was she being?”). Participants 
responded using a 5-point Likert scale: 1 (Very mean), 2 (A little mean), 3 (Not 
mean/not nice), 4 (A little nice), and 5 (Very nice).  
Time rating. Participants were asked if they would spend time with each 
speaker in the future (i.e., “Would you spend time with her in the future?). Participants 
responded using a 5-point Likert scale: 1 (Definitely not), 2 (Probably not), 3 (Maybe), 
4 (Probably, yes), and 5 (Yes, definitely). 
Popularity rating. Participants were asked how popular did they think the 
virtual player was (i.e., “How popular did you think she was?”). Participants responded 
using a 5-point Likert scale: 1 (Not at all popular), 2 (Not really popular), 3 (A little bit 
popular), 4 (Pretty much popular) and 5 (Very much popular). 
Humour rating. The final question asked participants to judge the humour of 
each virtual player (i.e., “How funny was she being?”). Participants responded using a 
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5-point Likert scale: 1 (Not at all funny), 2 (A little bit funny), 3 (Somewhat funny), 4 
(Very funny), and 5 (Extremely funny). 
After all the trials were completed, participants were asked whether they thought 
the other players in the game were real or not. This question is also used as a 
manipulation check to ensure that the participants believe they were receiving messages 
from real players. 
Language Measure 
To assess participants’ language skills, participants were administered the 
Expressive Vocabulary test from the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test-III 
(WIAT-III, Wechsler, 2009). In this task, participants are asked to verbally name 
various pictures after hearing a brief description of each item. Participants received a 
total score that could range from 0-17 on this measure.  
Questionnaires  
After the verbal irony task, participants were asked to complete a number of 
questionnaires in a booklet.   
 Shyness. Temperamental or trait shyness is a significant risk factor for social 
anxiety (Pickard et al., 2017) and research suggests that shyness and social anxiety may 
exist along a continuum (Brook & Willoughby, 2019; McNeil, 2001). So as to be 
sensitive to variations in social anxiety across a non-clinical sample, a measure of 
shyness as well as social anxiety were used.  
Shyness was assessed using the Revised Cheek and Buss Shyness Scale 
(RCBS), a self-report measure containing 20 items developed to assess everyday adult 
experiences of shyness (Cheek & Melichor, 1985). The 20 items are presented in the 
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format of 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Very uncharacteristic or untrue, 
strongly disagree) to 5 (Very characteristic or true, strongly agree). The RCBS has 
been shown to be a psychometrically sound measure of shyness given its strong internal 
reliability, α = .86, and two-week test-retest reliability, r = .88 (Hopko, Stowell, Jones, 
Armento, & Cheek, 2005). With the sample in the current study, the RCBS yielded a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .93.  
Participants also complete the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN), a self-report 
social anxiety questionnaire which contains 17 questions assessing clinical levels of 
social anxiety (Connor et al., 2000). All questions are presented as 5-point Likert 
scales, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). According to the developers, this 
measure demonstrates acceptable psychometric properties, including construct validity 
(Connor et al., 2000). With the participants in this study, the SPIN measure yielded a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .77. 
Within the current sample, the two measures were found to be highly correlated, 
r = .71, p < .001 (disattenuated correlation = .84). As such, the RCBS and SPIN total 
scores were standardized and then combined to create a composite variable including 
both shyness and social anxiety, hereafter referred to as the shyness measure. When 
looking at this measure’s reliability, the composite had a Cronbach’s alpha of .91. 
Teasing experience. Participants completed the Teasing Questionnaire-Revised 
(TQ-R), a self-report measure containing 29 items assessing the types of teasing 
experiences that an individual may have experienced as a child (Storch et al., 2004). 
Participants responded using a Likert scale from 0 (I was never teased about this) to 4 
(I was always teased about this). The TQ-R measures teasing in various domains and 
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has five subscales: performance, academic issues, social behaviour, family background, 
and appearance. For the purpose of this study, the total score was used in analyses. 
According to the developers, the TQ-R total score has high internal consistency, α = 
.89, and test-retest reliability, ICC = .87 (Strawser, Storch, & Roberti, 2005). When 
looking at the scale’s internal reliability, TQ-R scores for the current sample had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .86. 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses  
Outlier analyses were conducted per each variable (±3 SD). Only one outlier was 
found in the data (for the TQ-R), and was subsequently Winsorized for the analyses.  
All the data were analyzed for missing values. The TQ-R was found to have three 
missing values (.115%). Little’s Missing Completely At Random test was not significant, 
indicating that the values were missing completely at random, χ2 = 212.512, df = 195, p = 
.185. The values were imputed using single stochastic regression imputation. 
 To address the second research question, the shyness composite measure and 
teasing measure were dichotomized into high and low groups using a median split 
method. Not surprisingly, individuals in the high shyness group had significantly higher 
shyness composite scores than the low shyness group, t(88) = 11.167, p < .001. Similarly, 
individuals in the high teasing group had significantly higher teasing scores than the low 
teasing group, t(88) = 11.069, p < .001 (Table 1).  
Additionally, a variable was created to reflect the participants’ perception of their 
own social dominance. This variable is the sum of their responses to the profile questions, 
which tap into information about social status. Participant’s personal dominance scores 
were also dichotomized into high and low social status groups using a median split 
method. Individuals in the high personal dominance group had significantly higher scores 
than the low personal dominance group, t(88) = 12.214, p < .001 (Table 1).  
The continuous variables of the three individual differences (shyness, teasing 
experience, personal dominance) were correlated to examine potential associations. 
Analyses revealed that shyness was significantly correlated with teasing experience, r = 
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.264, df = 90, p = .012 (disattenuated correlation = .298), and personal dominance, r = -
.696, df = 90, p < .001 (disattenuated correlation = -.818). There was no significant 
correlation between teasing experience and personal dominance, r = -.027, df = 90, p = 
.800. Similar findings emerged when a correlation was conducted with the dichotomized 
variables.  
To ensure that there were no potential differences in the basic verbal skills of the 
various groups, the WIAT-III scores were analyzed using t-tests for each of the shyness, 
teasing, and perceived social dominance groups. No differences were found, ps > .429. 
The verbal measure was not included in further analyses.  
At the end of the tablet task, participants were asked if they believed the other 
virtual players were real or not real. Repeated measures ANOVAs for each of the five 
verbal irony items (i.e., belief, mean, time, popularity, funny) were conducted. Whether 
the participants thought the other players were real (n = 12) or not real (n = 78) was 
included as a between group variable for the belief question. There was no significant 
effect of this question (nor interactions), ps > .220, suggesting that whether the 
participant thought the other players were real or not did not impact their ability to 
accurately comprehend the statements.   
Interpretations of Statements  
As this task was novel in the sense that participants were situated within the 
interaction and on the receiving end of comments (versus a third-person task), the first set 
of analyses sought to explore how participants perceived statements generally. Further, 
whether the social status of the other player impacted participants’ perceptions was 
examined. To address these aims, participants’ responses were examined in series of 
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2(social dominance: high or low) x 2(statement type: literal or ironic) x 2(statement 
valence: compliment or criticism) repeated measures ANOVAs. Gender was initially 
included as a between group variable in all analyses but was removed (and thus, not 
reported) if there was neither a significant main effect nor interactions. Any interactions 
were further probed with paired t-tests and independent sample t-tests, with Bonferroni 
correction (i.e., .05/number of comparisons).  
All data were included when analyzing the speaker belief question (n = 90), but in 
subsequent questions, the values were only included if the belief question was answered 
correctly (n = 37) (consistent with past work, e.g., Glenwright & Pexman, 2010; 
Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2019). The rationale for this decision is that interpreting the 
other variables only makes sense if the participants accurately understood the beliefs of 
the speaker (see Table 2). 
Speaker belief. Participants’ responses were scored as accurate if, for 
compliments, participants rated that the virtual player thought the context was positive 
(i.e., that their time was fast) and for criticisms they correctly recognized that the virtual 
player thought the context was negative (i.e., that their time was slow). The proportion of 
times that the participants correctly identified the speaker’s belief for each condition was 
used for analyses.  
The omnibus 2x2x2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of statement valence, F(1, 
89) = 15.614,	ηp2 = .149,	 p < .001, and statement type, F(1, 89) = 98.380, ηp2 = .525, p < 
.001. These significant main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of 
statement type and statement valence, F(1, 89) = 26.219, ηp2 = .228, p < .001 (Figure 2).  
This interaction was examined through paired t-tests (collapsed across social dominance). 
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Participants were significantly more accurate in identifying the speaker belief for ironic 
criticisms versus ironic compliments, t(89) = 4.916, p < .001, but there was no difference 
between literal compliments or criticisms, p = .734. For both compliments and criticisms, 
participants were more accurate in understanding literal versus ironic comments, t(89) = 
10.889, 7.026, ps < .001, respectively for compliments and criticisms.  
 As noted above, for subsequent analyses, only those responses for which 
participants correctly identified the speaker belief were included. This reduced the 
number of participants included in the analyses to 37.  
Meanness rating. Gender was included as a between group factor in the analyses 
for meanness due to an interaction with the variables of interest.  
Results from the ANOVA yielded main effects of statement valence, F(1, 35) = 
78.978, ηp2 = .693, p < .001, and statement type, F(1, 35) = 60.850, ηp2 = .635, p < .001. 
However, this interaction was qualified by a significant interaction between these two 
variables, F(1, 36) = 134.652, ηp2 = .789, p < .001. Four paired t-tests were conducted 
with the meanness ratings collapsed across popularity and gender, revealing that literal 
compliments (M = 4.392, SD = 0.529) were rated as significantly nicer than literal 
criticisms (M = 2.297, SD = 0.600), t(36) = 14.566, p < .001, but that ironic compliments 
(M = 2.642, SD = 0.647) and ironic criticisms (M = 2.588, SD = 0.607) did not differ, p = 
.693. For criticisms, once applying Bonferroni correction, there was a marginally 
significant difference in the meanness ratings for ironic versus literal statements, t(36) = 
2.173, p = .036. For compliments, literal statements were viewed as significantly nicer 
than ironic statements, t(36) = 12.937, p < .001.    
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 The omnibus ANOVA also yielded a significant interaction between statement 
type and gender, F(1, 35) = 4.639, ηp2 = .117, p = .038. The interaction was probed using 
independent samples t-tests conducted between genders with the meanness ratings 
collapsed across social dominance and statement valence. Males and females did not 
differ on their ratings for literal statements (men: M = 3.458, SD = 0.334; women: M = 
3.390, SD = 0.364) or ironic statements (men: M = 2.427, SD = 0.418; women: M = 
2.705, SD = 0.478) ps > .094. Paired t-tests were conducted separately for males and 
females, and demonstrated that both males and females rated literal comments as nicer 
than ironic comments, t(11) = 7.497; t(24) = 4.540, respectively for males and females, ps 
< .001.  
 Time rating. Gender was included as a between group factor in the analyses due 
to an interaction with the variables of interest.  
When examining participants’ interest in spending time with the virtual player, 
main effects of statement valence, F(1, 35) = 53.373, ηp2 = .604, p < .001, and statement 
type, F(1, 35) = 29.814, ηp2 = .460, p < .001, emerged. However, these main effects were 
qualified by a number of interactions.  
There was a significant 3-way interaction of social dominance, statement type, 
and statement valence, F(1, 36) = 6.249, ηp2 = .148, p = .017 (Figure 3). To better 
understand this interaction, 2(social dominance) x 2(statement type) repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted for each statement valence.  
Compliments. There was a significant main effect of statement type, F(1, 36) = 
78.707, ηp2 = .686, p < .001, which revealed that participants had more interest in 
spending time with other players who used literal compliments (M = 3.946, SD = 0.669) 
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as opposed to ironic compliments (M = 2.743, SD = 0.698). There were no other 
significant effects, ps > .653. 
Criticisms. There was a significant main effect of type, F(1, 36) = 4.847, ηp2 = 
.119, p = .034, but this was qualified by a significant interaction with social dominance, 
F(1, 36) = 5.519, ηp2 = 133, p = .024. Paired t-tests revealed that participants wanted to 
spend more time with players who used ironic criticisms versus literal criticisms if the 
player was identified as socially dominant, t(36) = 3.397, p = .002, but not when the 
player was of low social status, p = .780. There was no difference in participants’ desire 
to spend with high versus low status players who used ironic or literal criticisms, ps > 
.053. 
The omnibus (i.e., 2x2x2) ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction 
between statement valence and gender, F(1, 35) = 8.567, ηp2 = .197, p = .006. Paired t-
tests revealed that both men and women wanted to spend more time with players who 
gave compliments (men: M = 3.188, SD = 0.623; women: M = 3.420, SD = 0.501) versus 
those who voiced criticisms (men: M = 2.792, SD = 0.587; women: M = 2.495, SD = 
0.570), men: t(11) = 3.014, p = .012; women: t(24) = 8.564, p < .001. Independent t-tests 
revealed that men and women reported wanting to spend time equally with those who 
made compliments or criticisms, ps > .151.  
 Popularity rating. There was a main effect of social dominance, F(1, 36) = 
43.513, ηp2 = .547, p < .001, wherein participants rated players described as high in social 
dominance (M = 3.233, SD = .459) as more popular than those with low social 
dominance (M = 2.760, SD = .351).  
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There were also main effects of statement valence, F(1, 36) = 6.968, ηp2 = .162, p 
= .012, and statement type, F(1, 36) = 20.031, ηp2 = .358, p < .001, which were qualified 
by a significant type by valence interaction, F(1, 36) = 9.941, ηp2 = .216, p = .003. Paired 
t-tests revealed that players who used literal compliments (M = 3.405, SD = 0.528) were 
viewed as more popular than those who used literal criticisms (M = 2.926, SD = 0.642), 
t(36) = 3.552, p = .001, but there was no difference in popularity ratings for those 
individuals who made ironic compliments (M = 2.831, SD = 0.550) versus criticisms (M 
= 2.824, SD = 0.467), p = .946. Those who used literal compliments were rated as more 
popular than those who used ironic compliments, t(36) = 5.243, p < .001, but there was 
no difference in popularity ratings between ironic and literal criticisms, p = .333. 
Humour rating. There was a main effect of statement type, F(1, 36) = 31.003, 
ηp2 = .463, p < .001, qualified by a significant interaction of type and valence, F(1, 36) = 
10.780, ηp2 = .230, p = .002. Paired t-tests (collapsed across social dominance) revealed 
that participants rated ironic comments as funnier than literal comments for both 
compliments (ironic: M = 2.128, SD = 0.829; literal: M = 1.304, SD = 0.453) and 
criticisms (ironic: M = 1.777, SD = 0.634; literal: M = 1.439, SD = 0.494), t(36) = 5.541, 
3.278, respectively for ironic and literal statements, ps < .001. Participants also rated 
ironic compliments as funnier than ironic criticisms, t(36) = 3.318, p = .002, but there 
was no difference in funny ratings between literal compliments and literal criticisms, p = 
.164. 
 In summary, using this first-person task revealed comprehension patterns (i.e., 
speaker belief question) consistent with past work using third-person tasks when studying 
verbal irony. Namely, literal comments were easier for individuals to understand than 
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ironic comments, and ironic criticisms were easier to understand than ironic 
compliments. Similarly, the speaker attitude showed a pattern consistent with the Tinge 
Hypothesis, but only for compliments. That is, an ironic compliment was considered less 
nice than a literal compliment. However, evidence for muting of the meanness was not 
found for criticisms. Irony (when used either to compliment or criticize) was seen as 
funnier than literal comments.  
Social dominance did not play a role in participants’ responses to these areas (i.e., 
belief, meanness, humour). It did however impact participants’ view of the popularity of 
the speaker and the degree of which they wanted to spend time with the other player. 
Participants perceived players with high social status as more popular than players with 
low social status, regardless of the language form that they use. Participants also wanted 
to spend more time with players with high social dominance if they used ironic criticisms 
versus literal criticisms; however, this pattern did not appear for players with low social 
status.  
Role of Shyness and Teasing on Interpretations of Statements  
To address the second research question, namely whether individual differences 
in shyness and teasing impacted participants’ interpretation of statements, mixed model 
ANOVAs where group category (high/low shyness or teasing) was included as a between 
group variable, and statement type, valence, and social dominance of speaker were within 
subject variables. Any interactions were further probed with paired t-tests and 
independent sample t-tests, with adjusted Bonferroni alpha values. To avoid repeating 
results above, only those findings that pertain to the group categories (i.e., shyness and/or 
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teasing) are discussed below. All analyses initially included gender, but this factor was 
removed (and not reported) if there were no interactions with the group category.  
Similar to previous analyses, all data were included when analyzing the speaker 
belief question, but values were only included in subsequent analyses if the belief 
question was answered correctly. (See Table 2).  
Shyness. Shyness group (i.e., high/low) was entered into the ANOVAs as a 
between group variable to determine whether this temperamental characteristic impacted 
how statements were interpreted. Only those findings pertaining to shyness are reported 
below. 
Speaker belief. For the speaker belief question, there was no main effect of 
shyness group nor significant interactions between any of the within subject variables, ps 
> .110.  
Meanness rating. Analyses did not reveal a main effect of shyness group or 
significant interactions with other variables, ps > .124.  
Time rating. For the time ratings, there was no main effect of shyness group, p = 
.489. However, analyses revealed a significant interaction between shyness group and 
valence, F(1, 35) = 5.116, ηp2 = 128, p = .030. Paired t-tests (collapsed across statement 
type and dominance) revealed that participants in the low and high shy groups wanted to 
spend time with players who made compliments more than those who made criticisms, 
t(18) = 4.469; t(17) = 7.717, respectively for low and high shyness groups, ps < .001. 
Independent t-tests (collapsed across statement type and social dominance) revealed no 
significant difference in time ratings between the high and low shyness groups for 
compliments (high shyness: M = 3.389, SD = 0.439; low shyness: M = 3.303, SD = 
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0.640) or criticisms (high shyness: M = 2.431, SD = 0.610; low shyness: M = 2.743, SD = 
0.531) ps > .104.  
The omnibus ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between shyness 
group and statement type, F(1, 35) = 4.505, ηp2 = .114, p = .041. Collapsed across 
valence and social dominance, paired t-tests revealed that both high and low shyness 
groups wanted to spend time with players who made literal comments more than ironic 
comments, high shyness: t(17) = 5.933, p < .001; low shyness: t(18) = 2.932, p = .009. 
Independent t-tests revealed that participants in the high shyness group versus low 
shyness group did not differ in how much they wanted to spend with literal or ironic 
speakers, ps > .557.  
Popularity rating. Results revealed a significant main effect of shyness group, 
F(1, 35) = 4.767, ηp2 = .120, p = .036, such that, in general, the high shyness group gave 
higher popularity ratings than the low shyness group. This main effect was qualified by a 
significant 4-way interaction of social dominance, type, valence, and shyness, F(1, 35) = 
9.201, ηp2 = .209, p = .005. To probe this interaction, additional ANOVAs were 
conducted for each statement valence condition.  
Compliments. There was no main effect of shyness nor interactions with any of 
the within group variables, ps > .292. 
Criticisms. There was a significant main effect of shyness group, F(1, 35) = 
7.786, ηp2 = .182, p = .008, the high shyness group gave higher popularity ratings than the 
low shyness group for critical speakers. This main effect was qualified by a significant 3-
way interaction of social dominance, statement type, and shyness, F(1, 35) = 8.967, ηp2 = 
.204, p = .005 (Figure 4).  
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To better understand the 3-way interaction within criticisms, additional shyness 
group x social dominance ANOVAs were conducted separately for ironic and literal 
criticisms. The ANOVA for literal criticisms revealed a main effect of shyness group, 
F(1, 35) = 8.129, ηp2 = .188, p = .007, indicating that shy individuals rated those who use 
literal criticisms as more popular than did non-shy individuals. There were no significant 
interactions between shyness and social dominance, p = .840.  
In contrast, for ironic criticisms there was no significant main effect of shyness 
group, p = .130, but analyses revealed a significant interaction between shyness and 
social dominance, F(1, 35) = 17.970, ηp2 = .339, p < .001. Paired t-tests revealed that the 
low shyness group did not rate speakers with high or low social status (using ironic 
criticisms) differently in terms of popularity, p = .734. However, the high shyness group 
rated speakers high in social dominance (using ironic criticisms) as more popular than 
speakers low in social dominance (using ironic criticisms), t(17) = 5.050, 2.932, 
respectively for high and low social status, ps < .001. Independent t-tests revealed that the 
high shyness group viewed speakers with high social dominance using ironic criticisms 
as being more popular than did the low shyness group, t(35) = 3.785, p = .001, but there 
was no group difference in how speakers with low social dominance were viewed, p = 
.132.  
 Humour rating. There was no main effect of shyness group or significant 
interactions with the other variables, ps > .193.  
 Taken together, participant shyness did not impact individuals’ ability to 
appreciate the speaker’s belief, nor the ratings for speaker attitude or humour. Although 
there were initial significant interactions between shyness and the conditions regarding 
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the participants’ desire to spend time with the various speakers, when further probed, 
group differences did not emerge. 
However, participant shyness was found to play a role in judgments on the 
players’ popularity. Shy individuals viewed players who use literal criticisms as more 
popular than did the non-shy individuals. Further, shy individuals perceived speakers 
with high social dominance who used ironic criticisms as more popular than did 
participants in the low-shy group.  
History of teasing. Similar to the analyses above, teasing group (i.e., high/low) 
was entered into the ANOVAs to determine whether this characteristic impacted how 
statements were interpreted. Only those findings that pertain to teasing are reported 
below. 
Speaker belief. There was no main effect of teasing group or significant 
interactions with other variables on participants’ judgments of speaker belief, ps > .134.  
Meanness rating. There was no main effect of teasing group or significant 
interactions with other variables on participants’ judgments of meanness, ps > .073.  
Time rating. There was no main effect of teasing group or significant interactions 
with other variables on participants’ desire to spend time with the other players, ps > 
.076.  
Popularity rating. When asked about the popularity of the other player, there was 
a significant main effect of teasing group, F(1, 35) = 4.767, ηp2 = .120, p = .036. In 
general, the high teasing group reported higher popularity ratings than the low teasing 
group. However, this effect was qualified by two significant interactions.  
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First, there was a significant 3-way interaction between teasing group, statement 
type, and valence, F(1, 35) = 4.314, ηp2 = .110, p = .045. To better understand this 
interaction, separate ANOVAs were conducted for each statement type (collapsed across 
social dominance).  
Ironic statements. There was no main effect of teasing group or significant 
interaction between teasing group and valence for ironic statements, ps > .644. 
Literal statements. There was no main effect of teasing group, p = .061, although 
analyses revealed a significant interaction between teasing group and valence, F(1, 35) = 
7.763, ηp2 = 182, p = .009. Paired t-tests conducted for each teasing group revealed that 
participants with a history of teasing did not rate the popularity of speakers making 
criticisms (M = 3.208, SD = 0.626) differently from those making compliments (M = 
3.333, SD = 0.420), p = .491. In contrast, participants with fewer teasing experiences 
rated speakers making compliments (M = 3.474, SD = 0.617) as more popular than those 
making criticisms (M = 2.658, SD = 0.548), t(18) = 4.717, p < .001. Further, independent 
t-tests revealed that those participants who endorsed a high amount of teasing rated 
speakers who used literal criticisms as being more popular than did the participants who 
endorsed fewer teasing experiences, t(35) = 2.851, p = .007, but there was no difference 
in ratings between teasing groups for speakers who made compliments, p = .427.  
Second, the omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant 3-way interaction between 
teasing group, social dominance, and valence, F(1, 35) = 4.883, ηp2 = .122, p = .034 
(Figure 5). To better understand the interaction, additional ANOVAs were conducted for 
each statement valence, collapsed across statement type.  
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Compliments. For the compliment conditions, there was no main effect of teasing 
group or interaction with social dominance on popularity ratings, ps > .458.   
Criticisms. There was a significant main effect of teasing group, F(1, 35) = 9.962, 
ηp2 = .222, p = .003. In general, the high teasing group gave higher popularity ratings 
than the low teasing group for players who used criticisms. The effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction between social dominance and teasing group, F(1, 35) = 11.251, 
ηp2 = .243, p = .002, for the popularity ratings of critical speakers. Paired t-tests 
conducted separately for the high versus low teasing groups revealed that individuals 
with fewer teasing experiences did not rate the popularity of speakers high in social 
dominance differently from speakers low in social dominance, p = .204. In contrast, 
participants in the high teasing group rated speakers high in social rank making criticisms 
as more popular than speakers low in social rank making criticisms, t(17) = 5.841, p < 
.001. Independent t-tests revealed that participants in the high teasing group did not view 
the popularity of players with low social dominance who made criticisms differently from 
the low teasing group, p = .444. However, the high teasing group viewed the critical 
players with high social dominance as more popular than did the low teasing group, t(35) 
= 4.114, p < .001.  
 Humour rating. There was a significant main effect of teasing history, F(1, 33) = 
5.851, ηp2 = .151, p = .021, such that generally, the high teasing group gave higher funny 
ratings than the low teasing group. There was also a main effect of gender, F(1, 33) = 
5.060, ηp2 = .133, p = .031, such that males gave higher funny ratings than females. 
Gender was included in the ANOVA due to a significant interaction with teasing history, 
F(1, 33) = 5.490, ηp2 = .143, p = .025. The omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant 3-
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way interaction between gender, teasing group, and statement type, F(1, 33) = 6.813, ηp2 
= .171, p = .014. This interaction was further probed with teasing group x statement type 
ANOVAs on the humour ratings (collapsed across valence and social dominance) 
conducted separately for men and women.  
Women. There was no main effect of teasing history or interaction with statement 
type, ps > .377.  
Men. For males, there was a significant main effect of teasing history, F(1, 10) = 
9.280, ηp2 = .481, p = .012, such that males with more teasing experience generally rated 
statements as funnier than males with less teasing experience. The main effect was 
qualified by an interaction of statement type and teasing, F(1,10) = 5.465, ηp2 = .353, p = 
.042. Paired t-tests revealed that men who reported less teasing in their past did not rate 
literal statements (M = 1.458, SD = 0.504) differently from ironic statements (M = 1.778, 
SD = 0.518), p = .208. However, males who endorsed more teasing experiences found 
ironic speakers (M = 3.000, SD = 0.451) marginally funnier than literal speakers (M = 
1.667, SD = 0.072), t(2) = 5.747, p = .029. Independent t-tests revealed that the teasing 
groups did not differ in how funny they viewed the literal comments, p = .505, but that 
the high teasing group found the ironic statements funnier than did the low teasing group, 
t(10) = 3.627, p = .005.  
The omnibus ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between gender, 
teasing, and social dominance, F(1, 33) = 6.110, ηp2 = .156, p = .019. To further 
understand this interaction, an additional teasing x social dominance ANOVA was 
conducted for each gender, collapsed across statement type and valence.  
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Women. There was no main effect of teasing or interaction with social dominance 
for women, ps > .178. 
 Men. There was a significant main effect of teasing group, F(1, 10) = 9.280, ηp2 = 
.481, p = .012, such that in general, males with more teasing experience gave higher 
funny ratings than males with less teasing experience. The effect was qualified by a 
significant social dominance and teasing interaction for men’s ratings of humour, F(1, 
10) = 5.174, ηp2 = .341, p = .046. Paired t-tests conducted separately for the high/low 
teasing groups revealed that men who reported more frequent teasing experiences found 
players with high social dominance (M = 2.500, SD = 0.250) funnier than players with 
low social dominance (M = 2.167, SD = 0.260), t(2) = 8.000, p = .015, but that the men 
who reported fewer teasing experiences did not rate players with high/low social status 
any differently (low social status: M = 1.625, SD = 0.390; high social status: M = 1.611, 
SD = 0.397), p > .873. However, it is important that the results are difficult to interpret 
given the small sample size within these groups (high teasing: n = 3, low teasing: n = 9). 
Moreover, independent t-tests revealed that across statement type/valence, men who 
reported a history of teasing perceived the players with high social status as funnier than 
did the men who reported less teasing experiences, t(10) = 3.578, p = .005, but this 
difference did not emerge when rating players with low social status, p = .052. 
 Taken together, teasing experience does not seem to impact individuals’ ability to 
accurately report on the speakers’ belief, nor on their ratings of the speakers’ meanness, 
or their desire to interact with the speakers. However, it did influence participants’ 
perceptions of popularity and humour.  
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With respect to perceptions of popularity, participants with more teasing 
experience perceived literal critical speakers as more popular than did the participants 
with less teasing experience. Further, participants with more teasing experience rated 
players high in social dominance using literal criticisms to be more popular than did the 
participants with fewer teasing experiences. These patterns were not seen for ironic 
statements. 
History of teasing also influenced participants’ humour ratings, but only for men. 
Men who reported more teasing experiences perceived ironic comments as funnier than 
literal comments, however this pattern was not seen for men with fewer teasing 
experiences. Moreover, the high teasing group viewed the ironic comments as funnier 
than the low teasing group. Further, men with more teasing experience viewed players 
high in social dominance as funnier than players low in social dominance, and gave 
higher ratings than did the less teasing group.  
Role of Perceived Social Dominance on Interpretations of Statements 
To address the third research question, namely how participants’ own perceived 
social dominance impacted their interpretation of statements, ANOVAs where social 
dominance groups (high/low; hereby after referred to as “personal dominance,” not to be 
confused with speaker’s social dominance) was included as a between group variable, 
and statement type, valence, and social dominance of the speaker were included as within 
subject variables. Any interactions were further probed with paired t-tests and 
independent sample t-tests, with adjusted Bonferroni alpha values. Only findings 
involving perceived personal dominance are discussed below. All analyses initially 
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included gender, but this factor was removed (and not reported) if there were no 
interactions with the group category (and other variables).  
All data were included when analyzing the speaker belief question, but values 
were only included in subsequent analyses if the belief question was answered correctly 
(see Table 2).  
Belief. There was no significant main effect of personal dominance on the belief 
ratings, p = .942, however, there was a significant interaction of statement type, statement 
valence, and personal dominance, F(1, 88) = 4.157, ηp2 = .045, p = .044. To better 
understand this interaction, further ANOVAs were conducted for each statement valence 
condition, collapsed across social dominance of the virtual player.  
Compliments. For compliments, there was no significant main effect of personal 
dominance and there was no interaction with statement type, ps > .660.  
Criticisms. For criticisms, there was no significant main effect of personal 
dominance, p = .732, but analyses revealed a marginal interaction of statement type and 
personal dominance, F(1, 88) = 3.698, ηp2 = .040, p = .058, that was not explored further.  
Meanness ratings. Analyses did not reveal a main effect of personal dominance 
or significant interactions with other variables, ps > .090. 
Time ratings. Analyses did not reveal a significant main effect of personal 
dominance, p = .186, however, there was a significant interaction between personal 
dominance, statement type, and valence, F(1, 35) = 7.171, ηp2 = .170, p = .011, on 
participants’ interest in spending further time with players. Separate ANOVAs were 
conducted for each statement valence (collapsed across social dominance of the virtual 
players). 
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Criticisms. There was no significant main effect of personal dominance or 
interaction with statement type for time ratings in criticism conditions, ps > .077. 
Compliments. Analyses did not reveal a significant main effect of personal 
dominance, p = .625. However, there was a significant 2-way interaction between 
statement type and personal dominance, F(1, 35) = 4.549, ηp2 = .115, p = .040. Paired t-
tests for high and low personal dominance groups revealed that both groups would rather 
spend time with players who gave literal compliments (M = 3.855, SD = 0.694; M = 
4.042, SD = 0.649, respectively for high and low personal dominance) than ironic 
compliments (M = 2.921, SD = 0.736; M = 2.556, SD = 0.622, respectively for high and 
low personal dominance), t(18) = 4.706; t(17) = 9.087, respectively for high and low 
personal dominance, ps < .001. An independent samples t-test revealed that individuals 
with high personal dominance did not differ from those who had low personal dominance 
on their ratings for literal or ironic compliments, p > .113.  
 Popularity ratings. The ANOVA did not reveal a significant main effect of 
personal dominance, p = .395. There was a significant main effect of gender, F(1, 33) = 
8.222, ηp2 = .199, p = .007, revealing that, in general, females give higher popularity 
ratings than males. This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between 
personal dominance and gender on popularity ratings, F(1, 33) = 4.564, ηp2 = .122, p = 
.040. Further analyses revealed a significant 4-way interaction involving personal 
dominance, type, valence, and social dominance (of the virtual player), F(1, 35) = 10.127, 
ηp2 = .224, p = .003. Additional ANOVAs were conducted for each statement valence.  
 Compliments. Analyses did not reveal a significant main effect of personal 
dominance, p = .847. Also, there was no significant interaction between perceived 
	62	
personal dominance, and statement type or social dominance (for the virtual player) for 
popularity ratings in compliment conditions, ps > .181.  
Criticisms. There was no significant main effect of personal dominance, p = .385. 
However, the ANOVA revealed a significant interaction of personal dominance, 
statement type, social dominance (of the virtual player), F(1, 35) = 7.811, ηp2 = .182, p = 
.008 (Figure 6). Additional ANOVAs were conducted with the popularity ratings for each 
statement type. 
Literal criticisms. There was no significant main effect of personal dominance 
group and there was no interaction with social dominance (of the virtual player) for 
popularity ratings in literal criticisms, ps > .424.  
Ironic criticisms. There was no significant main effect of personal dominance 
group, p = .528. However, analyses revealed a significant interaction between personal 
dominance and social dominance (of the virtual player), F(1, 35) = 8.067, ηp2 = .187, p = 
.007. This interaction was examined through paired t-tests to compare differences 
between high and low personal dominance groups when judging the popularity of 
characters described as either high or low in social dominance. Participants high and low 
in personal dominance did not differ in their ratings of virtual players described as low in 
social dominance, p = .132. However, when rating players high in social dominance, the 
high personal dominance group gave lower popularity ratings than did the low personal 
dominance group, t(35) = 2.190, p < .050.    
 Humour ratings. There was a significant main effect of personal dominance, 
F(1, 35) = 5.035, ηp2 = .126, p = .031, such that, generally, those of high perceived 
dominance give higher funny rating than those with low perceived dominance. The effect 
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was qualified by a significant interaction of personal dominance, type, valence, and social 
dominance (of the virtual player), F(1, 35) = 4.987, ηp2 = .125, p = .032. To better 
understand the interaction, ANOVAs were conducted for each statement valence.  
Criticisms. There was a significant main effect of personal dominance, F(1, 35) = 
6.047, ηp2 = .147, p = .019, such that the high personal dominance group (M = 1.783, SD 
= .437) generally gave higher funny ratings than the low personal dominance group (M = 
1.424, SD = .452). There was no interaction with personal dominance and statement type 
of social dominance (of the virtual player) for humour ratings in the criticism conditions, 
ps > .080.  
Compliments. There was no significant main effect of personal dominance group, 
p = .125. However, analyses revealed a significant interaction of perceived personal 
dominance and statement type, F(1, 35) = 4.529, ηp2 = .115, p = .040. Independent 
samples t-tests (collapsed on social dominance of the virtual player) revealed that the 
high personal dominance group (M = 1.276, SD = 0.362) did not differ from the low 
personal dominance group (M = 1.333, SD = 0.542) when judging the humour of literal 
compliments, p = .708. However, the high personal dominance group (M = 2.395, SD = 
0.788) rated ironic compliments as marginally funnier than the low personal dominance 
group (M = 1.847, SD = 0.777), t(35) = 2.217, p = .041. Paired t-tests within each 
dominance group revealed that, for participants with low personal dominance, there was a 
marginally significant difference in funny ratings between ironic and literal compliments, 
t(17) = 2.279, p = .036. However, the high personal dominance group perceived ironic 
compliments as funnier than literal compliments, t(18) = 6.369, p < .001.  
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In summary, participants’ own rating of dominance did not impact their accuracy 
on the speaker belief questions, or their meanness and time ratings. However, perceived 
social dominance impacted participants’ popularity ratings: participants with low 
perceived social status viewed players high in social dominance who use ironic criticisms 
as more popular than did the participants with high perceived social status. Additionally, 
individuals who rated themselves as high in dominance viewed compliments delivered in 




 This study examined how literal and ironic language was perceived in a first-
person task and whether the social dominance of the speaker impacted individuals’ 
interpretations. Further, this study examined the role that individual characteristics of the 
recipients (i.e., the participants), namely shyness, teasing experience, and perceived 
personal dominance, played in the interpretation of comments from others. It was 
hypothesized that individuals high in shyness and with teasing experience would have 
more negative interpretations of ironic speakers than individuals low in these 
characteristics, and this effect would be further exacerbated if the speaker was described 
as high in social status. To examine these hypotheses, participants engaged in a verbal 
irony task in which they received criticisms and compliments from virtual players 
(described as either high or low in social status), which were spoken in either a literal or 
ironic fashion. Several key findings about the relationship between the contextual factors, 
listener characteristics, and interpretations of communicative intention emerged. 
However, it is important to note that given the limitation of the participants’ overall lack 
of believability within the study’s deception (i.e., believing there were virtual players), 
and the small sample size after controlling for verbal irony belief, the following findings 
should be considered with caution.  
With respect to the first goal, results from the first-person task revealed 
comprehension patterns (i.e., speaker belief accuracy) that are consistent with past work 
using third-person perspective tasks when studying verbal irony (e.g., Mewhort-Buist & 
Nilsen, 2017), providing support for the first research hypothesis. Participants were better 
able to comprehend literal versus ironic comments, and ironic criticisms were easier to 
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understand than ironic compliments. It is likely that this pattern emerged because ironic 
compliments are a less frequently used language form (Garmendia, 2010) and, thus, 
participants were more likely to misunderstand the speaker’s intent. Participants’ 
interpretation of the speakers’ attitude (i.e., meanness ratings) provided partial support for 
the Tinge Hypothesis, which posits that irony mutes the impact of the message (Dews & 
Winner, 1995). Participants considered ironic compliments to be less nice than literal 
compliments. However, evidence for this muting effect did not emerge for criticisms. In 
the present study, the lack of a muting effect for ironic criticisms may be due to the first-
person nature of the task, such that participants were situated within the interaction and 
thus the criticisms (directed at them) may have been perceived as more harsh, even when 
spoken ironically. That is, Katz and Bowes (2011) suggest that with criticisms, the 
negative statement valence may be more salient than the difference between ironic and 
literal language; as such, muting might be found only with mildly sarcastic criticisms.  
When looking at humour ratings, results showed that participants perceived ironic 
comments as funnier than literal comments. This is consistent with the literature 
describing humour as a social function of verbal irony (Dews et al., 1995; Pexman	&	
Olineck,	2002). Together the findings suggest that immersing the participants within the 
interaction neither facilitates nor hinders the ability to detect ironic language (i.e., 
comprehension). Further, the pattern of results with respect to how the speaker is 
perceived does not change markedly from those studies using third-person tasks (though 
potentially there is less muting for ironic criticisms).  
This research had asked how the social dominance of the speaker impacted the 
interpretation of statements. Participants perceived players high in social dominance as 
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more popular than those low in social dominance, regardless of the language form they 
used. This main effect serves somewhat as a manipulation check, confirming that the 
social dominance descriptions accurately depicted the players differently in terms of a 
social dimension. The social dominance of the speaker did not impact how the speaker’s 
attitude or humour was perceived. However, it did impact participants’ desire to spend 
time with the speakers, as well as their perceptions of the speakers’ popularity. With 
respect to time, participants indicated that they wanted to spend more time with players 
with high social dominance who used ironic criticisms, when compared to those who 
used literal criticisms, but there was no effect for players with low social status. Thus, it 
may also be the case that ironic criticisms are seen as more acceptable from speakers with 
high social status (at least when compared to the acceptability of literal comments), but 
that this same acceptance is not found for speakers with low social dominance. 
Supporting this notion, participants indicated that they wanted to spend more time with 
players high in social rank who made ironic criticisms versus players who were of low 
dominance and made ironic criticisms (albeit marginally significant). These results may 
provide support that individuals with high social dominance are perceived in a more 
positive light, such that their social peers view them as more socially desirable. However, 
as discussed further below, it is unclear if “popularity” was interpreted by the participants 
as a positive or negative trait.  
The second aim of the present research was to investigate whether participants’ 
individual differences influenced their interpretations of statements, as well as any 
interactions with the speaker’s social status. The following will discuss each of the 
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individual differences (i.e., shyness, teasing experience, personal dominance) in 
succession, along with any interactions with the social rank of the speaker.  
Regarding the association between shyness and the comprehension of ironic 
statements, consistent with previous work (Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2017), shyness did 
not impact the ratings for speaker belief. However, contrary to this previous work and the 
proposed hypothesis, shyness was not associated with perceptions of ironic speakers’ 
attitude. That is, shyer participants did not rate ironic speakers to be meaner than non-shy 
participants. Further, shyness also did not play a role on humour ratings, or the desire to 
spend time with the speakers. It may be that, given the nature of the task in the present 
study, there was less ambiguity in the ironic comments. That is, the participants were 
given explicit direct feedback on their performance (i.e., described as faster or slower 
than the average), which may have reduced the variance in their irony interpretations and 
underestimated the role of the participants’ temperaments in their responses. In addition, 
previous work by Mewhort-Buist and Nilsen (2017) specifically recruited participants 
who scored high on shyness during a mass testing session, thus the sample used in that 
study had an overrepresentation of shy individuals. It may be that the sample used in the 
current study lacked sufficient variability in the shyness scores to allow temperament to 
play a significant role in the interpretation of statements. 
Although shyness did not affect how comments were interpreted generally, this 
characteristic was associated with how speakers were viewed socially, namely the 
popularity ratings. Shy individuals tended to interpret those who use criticisms as more 
popular than non-shy individuals. More specifically, shy individuals viewed speakers 
who used literal criticisms as more popular than did non-shy individuals, and shy 
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individuals viewed players high in social dominance who used ironic criticisms as more 
popular than did non-shy individuals. Overall, it appears that shyness impacts how an 
individual perceives others’ popularity (i.e., social status) according to the valence of the 
language. Past literature suggests that speakers who deliver insults are perceived as 
having higher status than the listener, regardless of statement type (i.e., literal or ironic; 
Dews et al., 1995). It seems that statement valence, and not statement type, plays an 
important role in a identifying a speaker’s social status, and negative comments are more 
indicative of higher social status than positive comments. It may be that criticisms are 
used as a signal of high social status, and to shy individuals, the use of negative 
comments is considered to be important information when determining others’ 
popularity. Given what is known about shy individuals’ sensitivity to social rank 
information (Aderka et al., 2013), it is likely that shy individuals consider the type of 
language one uses as an indication of social status when forming impressions of others. 
Alternatively, it may be that elevated sensitivity to social rank information, including 
within language cues, contributes to increased social reticence over time. 
Similar to shyness, a history of teasing did not influence participants’ 
understanding of speaker belief. There is no past literature looking into how individuals 
with negative peer experiences comprehend verbal irony. However, as verbal irony is 
used as a form of social bullying (Sheehan & Jordan, 2002), and more specifically, to 
mock or tease others (Gibbs, 2000), individuals who report higher levels of teasing may 
have had ample exposure to this language form to support successful comprehension. 
Contrary to prediction, teasing experience did not impact participants’ ratings of speaker 
meanness or desire to interact with other speakers. It was anticipated that individuals with 
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increased negative peer interactions would view ironic language as more hostile as per 
findings that ambiguous social situations are viewed as more threatening (i.e., Hostile 
Attribution Bias; Crick & Dodge, 1996). It may be the case that teasing experience did 
not play a role because the ‘interaction’ took place in an emotionally neutral context. 
That is, it may be the case that hostile attributions associated with individuals who have a 
history of negative interactions are activated in more emotionally charged situations. The 
nature of the verbal irony task used in the study may have underestimated the impact of 
victimization on the interpretation of statements; this includes the lack of ambiguity 
within the context itself (i.e., it was clear when it was a positive/negative context) and the 
lack of social tension within the social interactions.  
However, similar to the results with shyness, a history of teasing plays a role in 
how speakers’ social status is viewed, namely judgement of their popularity. Those 
individuals who reported more teasing experience viewed speakers who used literal 
criticisms as more popular, particularly when the speaker was described as socially 
dominant. It seems that individuals with increased teasing experience are more sensitive 
to the role that criticisms play in dictating social status (Dews et al., 1995).   
Participants’ history of teasing also influenced their ratings of how funny 
statements were, but only for men. However, it is important to note the reduction in 
sample size after controlling for speaker belief, and further splitting into high and low 
teasing groups, and gender. Men who reported more teasing experience perceived ironic 
comments as funnier than literal comments, and funnier than did the low teasing group. 
The impact of gender found here is consistent with past work showing that males enjoy 
sarcasm more (Druker, Fein, Bergerbest, & Giora, 2014), and tend to make more 
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sarcastic remarks (Colston & Lee, 2004). Although past literature suggests that verbal 
irony is used as a tool to be humorous (Pexman	&	Olineck,	2002), it is unclear why men 
with more teasing in their past perceive ironic language as more humorous than those 
with less teasing experience. Though speculative (and somewhat counterintuitive), it may 
be the case that increased teasing experiences provided these men with more experience 
with irony, which resulted in greater appreciation for the humour function of this 
language form.  
While not specific to a particular language form, men with more teasing 
experience viewed individuals high in social dominance as funnier than individuals low 
in social dominance, and gave higher humour ratings than did the participants with less 
teasing experience. Past work shows that humour and telling jokes are often used as a 
signal for social dominance (Fry, 2011). The literature also suggests that comments 
delivered by an individual with high social status are more likely to be perceived as a 
joke than those delivered by individuals with low social status (Simmons & Parks-Yancy, 
2012). In addition, it is more acceptable for individuals with high social status to engage 
in aggressive behaviour (Adams et al., 2010), which is implicated in some aspects of 
humour (Fry, 2011). The results from the current research support the hypothesis that 
those of high social dominance are perceived as more positive, and in this case, funnier. 
Here we find that men who have more teasing experience are especially sensitive to the 
relationship between social dominance and humour.  
The final aim of the study was the impact that participant’s perceptions of their 
own social dominance on their interpretation of comments made by players. Contrary to 
the hypothesis, personal dominance did not impact participant’s comprehension of the 
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statements, nor their interpretation of speaker attitude. However, it did impact 
participants’ ratings of player’s popularity, depending on the social dominance of the 
player.  
More specifically, participants with low perceived social status viewed players 
high in social dominance who use ironic criticisms as more popular than did the 
participants with high perceived social status. It may be the case that ironic criticisms, as 
noted above for criticisms in general, are viewed as the type of language used by 
individuals with high social rank. However, the sensitivity to this potential difference is 
noticed primarily in individuals who consider themselves to be of low rank. That is, past 
work shows that individuals who are low in social dominance are particularly sensitive to 
cues to social status (i.e., popularity), possibly because when there are social conflicts 
between individuals high and low in social status, there are often more detrimental 
consequences for those with low social rank (Gilbert, 2001; Prinstein & Cisllessen, 
2003). Thus, these individuals may be searching their social environment for clues to 
social rank in a way that individuals with high social dominance do not.  
Additionally, individuals who rated themselves as high in dominance generally 
perceived critical comments as funnier than did peers who perceived themselves as low 
in dominance. Dews and colleagues (1995) suggest that those who use criticisms are 
considered to be higher in social rank than the listener and aggressive behaviour is 
viewed as more appropriate when from individuals of high social dominance (Adams et 
al., 2010). While it is not known whether individuals high in social rank are actually more 
critical, the findings here suggest that if this is the case, it may be due to them finding 
critical language more humorous.  
	73	
Further, individuals who rated themselves as high in dominance viewed 
compliments delivered in an ironic fashion as funnier than those spoken literally and as 
funnier than did their peers who perceived themselves as low in dominance. Recall that 
irony is thought to mute the impact of statements, rendering ironic compliments less 
complimentary than literal compliments. Moreover, verbal irony is a socially risky 
language form given the involvement of both humour and aggression within the 
comments (Shapiro et al., 1991), with ironic compliments as particularly risky given that 
the literal meaning of the words is negative. Thus, similar to above with criticisms, it 
appears that individuals with high social status tend to focus on the humour within such 
risky language.  
 In summary, the results together suggest that individual differences in terms of 
shyness, teasing experience, and perceived personal dominance do not play a role in how 
a speakers’ belief is understood, nor their attitude. Where there seems to be the most 
impact is when interpreting the social status of the speaker, namely how popular he/she 
is. The general trend is for those individuals who are shy, have a history of teasing, or 
low perceived dominance to view speakers who use critical language as being more 
popular. There are also some patterns with humour ratings, in which individuals with 
more verbal irony experience (i.e., history of teasing, high personal dominance) better 
appreciate the humour function of ironic language. However, these findings are tentative 
and future work may further explore the association between individual differences and 
the interpretation of various types of language.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
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 Although this research sheds some insight into the factors that influence the 
interpretation of verbal irony, it is not without its limitations. One such limitation was the 
artificial nature of the social interaction between participants and the (virtual) players. 
Although measures were taken to encourage the authenticity of the task, when asked, 
87% of the participants suspected that the other players were not real. Further analyses 
showed that there was no significant effect or interactions with belief accuracy, 
suggesting that whether the virtual players were real or not did not impact participant’s 
ability to accurately understand the statements. However, it may be that the artificial 
social interaction between the participant and the virtual players means that the 
contextual and individual differences were underestimated. Further, it may be the case 
that social dominance information is meaningful in a more personal context (i.e., with 
people who know each other) as opposed to this setting involving virtual players. Future 
work should utilize more naturalistic paradigms to explore the interpretation and 
production of verbal irony (and associations with individual differences) in real-world 
settings.  
An additional factor that may have contributed to the lack of believability of the 
task was the potential mismatch between a participant’s perception of their performance 
and their feedback. The feedback given to the participants (i.e., that their performance 
was either faster or slower than the average) was fixed according to the condition within 
the counterbalancing order assigned to each participant, and not their actual performance. 
Consequently, participants may have perceived themselves to have performed well (i.e., 
completed the trial quickly), but received negative feedback (i.e., that their time was 
slower than the average time). Similarly, the participants may have perceived themselves 
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to have performed poorly (i.e., completed the trial slowly), but received positive feedback 
(i.e., that their time was faster than the average time). Given this, the contrast between 
how a participant perceived their performance and their feedback might have impacted 
the authenticity of the verbal irony task. Further, the “average time” that was shown to 
the participants was a constant ratio of their actual time; that is, in the criticism and 
compliment trials, participants were told that the average time was 30% faster or slower 
than their actual performance, respectively. Participants may have noticed the constant 
ratio between their performance and the average performance, which would have 
influenced the believability of the task. Future work could vary the ratio so it is more 
believable, as well as measure participants’ responses times in order to assess for overt 
mismatches between performance and feedback.  
The verbal irony task consisted of 16 trials in total, with two trials in each 
condition. The number of trials was reduced to ensure that the task was feasible in terms 
of timing for each participant. Although more trials per condition would have increased 
the power of the current study, it would have also increased the time for each participant 
to complete the task and further decreased the believability that other virtual players were 
also simultaneously engaging in the same task.  It should also be noted that the number of 
participants included in the analyses became very small when controlling for belief 
accuracy (i.e., dropping the sample from 90 to 37 participants during data analysis and 
even lower when breaking participants into high/low groups). Controlling for speaker 
belief was essential because it would not make sense to interpret speaker attitudes (for 
example) if it was clear the participant did not accurately comprehend what the speaker 
thought. However, it may well be the case that different results would emerge with larger 
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sample sizes. Further work would benefit from a larger sample size and potentially 
explicitly telling people about the speaker’s belief and intentions (e.g., “Sam thinks your 
gameplay was slow and sarcastically says to you, “great job”) so that all data can be 
included when examining the more nuanced features of how ironic language is 
interpreted, such as attitude and humour.   
The current study conducted analyses with participants’ shyness, teasing 
experience, and personal dominance as dichotomous variables, using a median split 
method on continuous data to create high and low groups. Splitting at the median is 
typically not recommended due to its effect on the reduction of power (Aiken & West, 
1991); however, given the complexity of the model, grouping the participants within the 
repeated measures ANOVAs were used for simplicity and practicality purposes. As such, 
the current study may be underestimating the effects within the data, and further work 
should maintain power by treating the variables as continuous and input the measures 
into multiple regression analyses. Further, given the shared variance between shyness and 
personal dominance (r = -.696, df = 90, p < .001 (disattenuated correlation = -.818)), it 
may be the case that these variables should be treated as a single construct, which would 
simplify the analyses. 
Many of the significant results were found in the participants’ popularity rating. 
While this may be indicative of participants’ seeing the speaker’s comments as more 
relevant to their social status than about the words or intentions behind the words 
themselves, it is difficult to say as we do not know exactly how participants interpreted 
the word “popular.” The word “popularity” may be perceived as either a positive or 
negative quality. For example, literature shows that there may be two constructs within 
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popularity among youth: those who are liked by their peers and display prosocial 
behaviours, and those who are not necessarily well-liked given that they display a mix of 
prosocial and manipulative behaviours (Cillessen & Rose, 2005). As such, participants 
may have differing perceptions when asked about how popular the virtual players were, 
and future work may benefit from distinguishing between the two constructs.  
In addition, the gender findings should be interpreted somewhat with caution 
given that the virtual players were also gender matched to the participant gender (i.e., 
females interacted with female social partners, and males interacted with male social 
partners). The reason for gender matching was to control for confounds such as gender 
(mis)match. However, this decision meant that any gender effects that emerged could be 
due to participant gender or gender of the social partner. Further follow-up work could 
explore ironic interpretation between female-female, male-male, and female-male dyads.   
Conclusion 
The present study utilized a novel paradigm to explore the interpretation of literal 
and ironic language. Generally, this first-person task resulted in similar patterns when 
compared to the third-person perspective tasks that are often used in the verbal irony 
literature. For the most part, speaker dominance did not affect how participants 
interpreted literal or ironic statements. In addition, the individual characteristics of the 
listeners (shyness, history of teasing, and perceived dominance) did not affect how the 
speaker beliefs/attitude were interpreted. However, the individual characteristics of the 
participant were associated with differences in how the social statuses of the speakers 
(particularly those using critical language) were interpreted. Findings contribute to a 
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growing research as to how listener characteristics potentially influence how speakers are 
perceived.   
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Descriptive statistics for the measures 
Measure  n M SD Range 
RCBS 90 40.067 12.243 3.000 – 100.000 
SPIN 90 54.256 14.347 24.000 – 88.000 
     Shyness composite 90 0.000 1.848 -4.710 – 4.960 
          High shy group 45 1.407 1.136 0.110 – 4.960 
          Low shy group 45 -1.407 1.253 -4.710 – 0.110 
TQ-R 90 21.522 13.813 0.000 – 69.000 
          High teasing 43 31.447 11.883 18.000 – 69.000 
          Low teasing 47 10.674 4.352 0.000 – 17.000 
Social Dominance 90 19.677 5.469 5.000 – 30.000 
          High Dominance 40 24.400 2.023 22.000 – 30.000 
          Low Dominance 50 15.720 4.111 5.000 – 21.000 
Note. Data were Winsorized before analyses.
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Table 1 
Average responses for the Verbal Irony (“I Spy”) Task (SD in parentheses)   
Variable  High social dominance Low social dominance 
Ironic Literal Ironic Literal 
Compliment Criticism Compliment Criticism Compliment Criticism Compliment Criticism 
















































































Note. The number of participants for speaker belief accuracy questions is n = 90; the remaining variables control for correct speaker 
belief accuracy and the analyses are based on a sample size of n = 37.		
	 94 
Figure 1. Example screens from verbal irony task: a) participants’ personal dominance 
profile; b) example of virtual player's social dominance profile (low dominance shown); 
c) mock-up example of "I Spy" task (please note that actual stimuli reflected much higher 
degree of difficulty); d) example of performance feedback screen.  
	 95 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of accurate responses to speaker belief question as a function of 
statement type and valence (collapsed across social dominance of the speaker). Error bars 





























Figure 3. Amount of time participants wanted to spend with the virtual players, as a 
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Figure 4. Popularity ratings for players who use criticisms as a function of statement type 
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Figure 5. Popularity ratings for players, as a function of statement valence, teasing 
experience and social dominance of the speaker (collapsed across statement type). Error 
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Figure 6. Popularity ratings for players who use criticisms as a function of statement 
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